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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Laws  requiring  banks  to  hold  a  volume  of  reserves 
equal  to  a  prescribed  fraction  of  their  deposits  orig- 
inated  in  this  country  more  than  a  century  ago. 
Since  then  both  the  financial  system  and  the  ra- 
tionales  supporting  reserve  requirements  have 
changed  considerably.  Nevertheless,  the  practice  of 
requiring  reserves  has  continued  without  interrup- 
tion.  This  article  examines  the  history  and  function 
of  reserve  requirements  at  the  national  level  and 
assesses  the  validity  of  various  prominent  reserve 
requirement  rationales. 
Section  II  reviews  the  history  of  reserve  require- 
ments,  focusing  on  the  succession  of  rationales  that 
have  supported  major  reserve  requirement  legisla- 
tion.  The  prominent  rationales  have  been,  in  turn, 
that  reserve  requirements  have  been  necessary  for 
liquidity  provision,  Federal  Reserve  credit  policy, 
and  monetary  control.  However,  the  discussion  in 
Section  II  explains  that  reserve  requirements  have 
never  served  these  functions  well,  and  often  have  not 
served  them  at  all.  On  the  other  hand,  reserve 
requirements  have  consistently  functioned  to  help 
finance  the  United  States  Treasury.  Section  III 
describes  the  financing  function  of  reserve  require- 
ments  and  documents  its  importance  in  reserve  re- 
quirement  legislation  throughout  the  history  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  System  up  to  and  including  the 
Monetary  Control  Act  of  1980.  The  analysis  is 
summarized  in  the  conclusion. 
II. 
CRITIQUE  OF  PROMINENT  RESERVE 
REQUIREMENT  RATIONALES 
The  prominent  rationales  for  reserve  requirements 
at  the  national  level  can  be  roughly  separated  accord- 
ing  to  the  periods  in  which  they  were  popular.  The 
argument  that  reserve  requirements  are  necessary 
for  providing  bank  liquidity  was  offered  in  support 
of  reserve  requirements  from  their  initial  imposition 
at  the  national  level  during  the  Civil  War  through 
the  creation  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System.  The 
argument  that  reserve  requirements  contributed  im- 
portantly  to  Federal  Reserve  credit  policy  became 
prominent  in  the  early  years  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
System.  The  credit  policy  rationale  has  since  evolved 
into  the  argument  that  reserve  requirements  are 
useful  for  monetary  control.  This  section  discusses 
each  rationale  in  turn,  explaining  both  theoretically 
and  practically  where  appropriate  why  reserve  re- 
quirements  have  rarely  functioned  as  indicated  in 
the  standard  rationales. 
Liquidity  Provision 
Reserve  requirements  on  bank  deposits  were  first 
established  at  the  national  level  in  1863  with  the  pas- 
sage  of  what  is  known  as  the  National  Bank  Act. 
The  main  provisions  of  the  National  Bank  Act 
helped  to  create  a  uniform  national  currency  and 
provided  banks  with  an  alternative  to  a  state  charter 
by  establishing  a  national  charter  under  which  they 
could  organize.  Banks  with  national  charters  were 
required  to  keep  a  25  percent  reserve  against  both 
note  and  deposit  liabilities.  For  national  banks  in 
“redemption  cities”  designated  in  the  Act,  the  re- 
serve  was  to  be  held  entirely  in  lawful  money  (specie 
and  greenbacks)  in  the  bank’s  vault.  Banks  outside 
the  redemption  cities  were  permitted  to  hold  three- 
fifths  of  their  required  reserves  with  national  banks 
in  redemption  cities.  Since  interbank  deposits  paid 
interest  and  provided  other  benefits,  this  rule  greatly 
reduced  the  cost  of  required  reserve  maintenance  for 
non-redemption  relative  to  redemption  city  banks. 
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When  the  National  Bank  Act  was  rewritten  in 
1864,  reserve  requirements  of  non-redemption  city 
banks  were  reduced  to  15  percent  and,  in  addition, 
banks  in  redemption  cities  other  than  New  York 
were  permitted  to  hold  one-half  of  their  required  re- 
serves  with  national  banks  in  New  York  City.l  In 
effect,  the  percent  reserve  required  to  be  held  in  law- 
ful  money  in  a  bank’s  vault  was  “graduated”  from 
25  percent  for  New  York  City  banks,  to  12.5  per- 
cent  for  redemption  city  banks  outside  of  New  York 
City,  to  6  percent  for  non-redemption  city  banks. 
The  reduction  in  the  reserve  requirement  burden  for 
banks  outside  of  New  York  City  helped  to  increase 
the  attractiveness  of  a  national  relative  to  a  state 
charter.  This  was  important,  since  membership  in 
the  National  Banking  System  was  voluntary,  in 
keeping  with  the  so-called  “dual  banking  system 
tradition,”  i.e.,  the  coexistence  of  state  and  Federal 
regulatory  authorities,  established  with  the  National 
Bank  Act. 
Reserve  requirements  in  the  National  Bank  Act 
were  apparently  rationalized  as  being  necessary  to 
ensure  bank  liquidity,  that  is,  the  ability  of  banks  to 
convert  deposits  into  currencye2  The  geographically 
graduated  reserve  requirement  structure  seemed  con- 
sistent  with  the  liquidity  rationale,  since  roughly 
speaking,  the  more  central  a  bank’s  position  in  the 
financial  system,  the  more  lawful  money  required 
reserves  it  had  to  hold. 
Reserve  requirements  could  have  completely  guar- 
anteed  convertibility  if  the  required  reserve  ratio 
had  been  100  percent  in  lawful  money  in  the  bank’s 
vault.  A  reduction  in  deposits  would  then  have  re- 
duced  required  reserves  by  an  equal  amount,  releas- 
ing  enough  funds  to  meet  the  withdrawal.  How- 
ever,  100  percent  reserve  requirements  would  also 
have  imposed  a  considerable  burden  on  banks,  and 
would  have  been  difficult  to  enforce  since  national 
banks  had  the  alternative  of  a  state  charter,  which 
generally  carried  with  it  relatively  low  or  zero  re- 
serve  requirements  on  deposits.  On  the  other  hand, 
with  the  fractional  reserve  requirements  specified  in 
the  National  Bank  Act  a  withdrawal  only  released  a 
portion  of  the  funds  demanded  by  the  depositor. 
1 Original  Acts  Pertaining  to  National  Banks  .  .  .  [39], 
pp.  19-20, 43-44. See Board  of  Governors  [123,  pp.  955-56. 
2 It  should  be  noted  that an important  motive  underlying 
the  National  Bank  Act  was  the need  to  finance  the  Civil 
War.  One  device  designed  in  part  to  help  finance  the 
War  was  the  requirement  that  National  Bank  notes  be 
backed  by  government  bonds.  By  tying  note  issue  to 
bond  holdings  the  government  attempted  to  enlarge  the 
demand  for  its  debt.  See  Davis  [22];  Hammond  [33, 
341;  and  Million  [37]  for  discussions  of  the  origins  of 
the  National  Bank  Act.  Newcomb  [38]  contains  a 
critical  appraisal  of  the  National  Bank  Act  as  a  war- 
financing  measure. 
Since  required  reserves  held  against  other  deposits 
could  not  be  used  without  penalty,  an  individual 
bank’s  ability  to  convert  deposits  into  currency  still 
depended  on  its  excess  reserves  or  secondary  reserves 
in  the  form  of  assets  which  could  be  easily  sold. 
Furthermore,  although  reserve  requirements  contrib- 
uted  somewhat  to  individual  bank  liquidity,  the  bank- 
ing  crises  of  1873,  1893,  and  1907  demonstrated  that 
fractional  reserve  requirements  could  not  guarantee 
sufficient  liquidity  for  the  banking  system  as  a whole.3 
The  main  contemporary  criticism  of  the  reserve 
requirement  provisions  in  the  National  Bank  Act 
was  that  they  continued  to  allow  a  “pyramiding”  of 
reserves  in  financial  center  banks.  The  practice  of 
counting  correspondent  balances  as  legal  reserves, 
combined  with  the  fact  that  banks  could  earn  interest 
on  their  deposits  with  banks  in  major  cities,  meant 
that  reserves  tended  to  concentrate  in  the  major 
cities,  especially  in  New  York  City.  Reduction  of 
these  interbank  balances  in  peak  agricultural  periods 
in  particular  tended  to  put  contractionary  seasonal 
pressure  on  banks  in  the  major  cities,  and,  in  turn, 
on  banks  throughout  the  country. 
The  Federal  Reserve  Act  of  1913  was  in  large  part 
designed  to  alleviate  the  two  main  problems  of  the 
National  Bank  Act  era,  namely,  recurrent  liquidity 
crises  and  seasonal  contractions  due  to  reserve  pyra- 
miding.  Specifically,  as  stated  in  its  preamble,  the 
purposes  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  were  “to  pro- 
vide  for  the  establishment  of  Federal  reserve  banks, 
to  furnish  an  elastic  currency,  to  afford  means  of  re- 
discounting  commercial  paper,  to  establish  a  more 
effective  supervision  of  banking  in  the  United  States, 
and  for  other  purposes.“*  The  rediscounting  mechan- 
ism,  which  allowed  Federal  Reserve  member  banks 
to  borrow  from  Federal  Reserve  Banks  using  eli- 
gible  paper  as  collateral,  helped  to  guarantee  li- 
quidity  by  providing  a  readily  accessible  source  of 
reserves  for  the  banking  system.  By  requiring  that 
member  banks  hold  reserves  directly  in  one  of  the 
twelve  Federal  Reserve  Banks,  the  Federal  Reserve 
Act  eliminated  pyramiding  and  made  the  banking 
system  less  vulnerable  to  seasonal  fluctuations  in  re- 
serve  needs. 
Apparently,  reserve  requirements  continued  to  be 
imposed  under  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  on  the  basis 
a See  Sprague  [45]  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  bank 
crises  in  the  National  Banking  era. 
4 “Federal  Reserve  Act  of  1913”  [24],  p.  2.5.  See  Fried- 
man  and  Schwartz  [28],  pp.  168-72,  189-96 for  a  discus- 
sion  of  the  need  to  furnish  an  elastic  currency.  For 
discussion  of  the  drafting  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act, 
the  proposals  that  preceded  it,  and  a  comparison,  see 
Willis  [67];  U.  S.  National  Monetary  Commission  [64]; 
and  Warburg  1653 respectively. of  the  liquidity  rationale.  The  Federal  Reserve  Act 
retained,  for  reserve  requirement  purposes,  the  clas- 
sification  of  banks  under  the  National  Bank  Act  in 
what  were  known  as  central  reserve  city,  reserve 
city,  and  country  bank  categories.  In  addition,  the 
Federal  Reserve  Act  went  further  and  distinguished 
between  demand  and  time  deposits  for  reserve  re- 
quirement  purposes.  Reserve  requirements  on  de- 
mand  deposits  were  reduced  to  18,  15,  and  12 percent 
on  central  reserve  city,  reserve  city,  and  country 
banks  respectively.  But  the  net  effect  of  these  re- 
ductions  on  reserve  city  and  country  banks  must  also 
take  account  of  the  fact  that  these  classes  of  banks 
could  no  longer  partially  satisfy  reserve  requirements 
by  holding  interest-earning  correspondent  balances. 
On  net,  noninterest-earning  reserve  requirements 
against  demand  deposits  were  lowered  for  central 
reserve  city  banks,  but  raised  for  both  reserve 
city  and  country  banks.  However,  all  classes  of 
banks  benefitted  from  the  relatively  low  5  percent 
reserve  requirement  on  time  deposits.  The  sub- 
stantial  differential  in  favor  of  time  deposits  was  ap- 
parently  established  to  enable  member  banks  to  com- 
pete  more  effectively  with  state-chartered  banks,  who 
generally  had  a  lower  or  zero  reserve  requirement  on 
time  deposits.5  This  was  beneficial  since  Federal 
Reserve  membership  was  voluntary,  in  keeping  with 
the  tradition  of  choice  established  with  the  National 
Bank  Act.s  The  dual  banking  system  tradition  con- 
strained  the  Federal  Reserve  and  was  to  become  an 
important  issue  in  later  reserve  requirement  legis- 
lation.7 
By  the  192Os,  Fed  policy  had  grown  from  an  al- 
most  purely  defensive  operation  trying  to  ensure  con- 
vertibility  and  avert  crises  to  one  of  actively  attempt- 
ing  to  influence  credit  conditions.  A  new  rationale 
for  reserve  requirements  emerged  along  with  this 
shift  in  Fed  policy  and  the  liquidity  rationale  was  of- 
ficially  rejected  in  the  report  of  the  1931  Federal  Re- 
serve  System  Committee  on  Bank  Reserves: 
The  committee  takes  the  position  that  it  is  no 
longer  the  primary  function  of  legal  reserve  re- 
quirements  to  assure  or  preserve  the  liquidity  of 
the  individual  member  bank.  The  maintenance  of 
liquidity  is  necessarily  the  responsibility  of  bank 
management  and  is  achieved  by  the  individual 
bank  when  an  adequate  proportion  of  its  portfolio 
consists  of  assets  that  can  be readily  converted  into 
cash.  Since  the  establishment  of  the  Federal  Re- 
5 See  U.  S.  Congress,  House  [48],  p.  73. 
s Although  Federal  Reserve  membership  was  mandatory 
for  national  banks,  banks  could  voluntarily  choose  a 
national  or  a  state  charter. 
7 For  good  discussions  of  the history  of  the dual banking 
system  tradition  and  how  that  tradition  constrained  the 
Fed,  see  Federal  Reserve  Committee  on  Branch,  Group, 
and  Chain  Banking  [27],  and  Wingfield  [68]. 
serve  System,  the  liquidity  of  an  individual  bank 
is  more  adequately  safeguarded  by  the  presence  of 
the  Federal  Reserve  banks,  which  were  organized 
for  the  purpose,  among  others,  of  increasing  the 
liquidity  of  member  banks  by  providing  for  the 
rediscount  of  their  eligible  paper,  than  by  the 
possession  of  legal  reserves.8 
Fed  Credit  Policy 
As  the  following  quote  from  the  1931  Fed  Com- 
mittee  on  Bank  Reserves  indicates,  the  role  attrib- 
uted  to  reserve  requirements  in  Fed  credit  policy 
served  as  the  new  rationale  for  their  continued  im- 
position  : 
The  most  important  function  served  by  member 
bank  reserve  requirements  is  the  control  of  credit. 
The  overexpansion  of  credit  may  take  a  par- 
ticular  form,  such  as excessive  loans  on farm  lands, 
on urban  real  estate,  or  on  securities,  or  it  may  be 
more  general  applying  to  a wide  range  of  bankable 
assets.  .  .  .  It  is  the  function  of  reserve  require- 
ments  to  restrain  such  overexpansion  by  making  it 
necessary  for  banks  to  provide  for  additional  re- 
serves  before  they  expand  their  credit.9 
As  a  practical  matter,  reserve  requirements  did 
not  function  well  to  control  credit  and  played  only  a 
minor  role  in  the  execution  of  Fed  credit  policy  in 
the  1920s.  The  Fed  Committee  on  Bank  Reserves 
itself  admitted  : 
In  1928  and  1929,  however,  during  the  most  ex- 
travagant  phases  of  the  stock-market  boom,  exces- 
sive  credit-demands  were  reflected  in  an  increase 
in  borrowings  from  nonbanking  lenders,  and  an 
unprecedented  increase  in  the  activity  of  bank 
deposits  without  an  increase  in  their  total  volume. 
Reserve  requriements,  consequently,  failed  com- 
pletely  during  those  crucial  years  to  act  as a  brake 
on  the  unsound  use  of  credit.10 
Throughout  most  of  the  1920s  and  most  of  the 
early  years  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  as  well, 
the  discount  rate  was  the  primary  Fed  policy  instru- 
ment.  During  much  of  this  period  the  discount  rate 
was  set  below  even  the  call  money  rate  received  on 
loans  with  essentially  no  risk  of  default,  thereby 
making  it  profitable  for  the  banking  system  to  bor- 
row  continuously  at  the  Reserve  Banks.rl  For  ex- 
ample,  member  bank  discount  window  borrowing 
was  roughly  2  billion  dollars  or  above  throughout 
1919  and  1920,  even  exceeding  member  bank  reserve 
balances  at  the  Fed.  For  the  decade  as  a  whole, 
discounts  made  up  over  half  of  Federal  Reserve 
credit  outstanding. 
s Committee  on  Bank  Reserves  [ZO],  pp.  260-61. 
9 Ibid.,  pp.  264-65. 
10 Ibid.,  p.  265. 
11 Historical  statistics  referred  to  throughout  this  dis- 
cussion  may  be  found  in  Board  of  Governors  [8],  Sec- 
tions  9,  10, and  12. -4- 
The  Fed  influenced  market  interest  rates  and 
credit  conditions  throughout  the  period  primarily  by 
manipulating  the  discount  rate.  The  discount  rate 
was  raised  to  restrain  credit  and  lowered  to  en- 
courage  credit  expansion.  Use  of  the  discount  rate 
in  this  manner  meant  that  credit,  money,  and  re- 
quired  reserves  were  largely  accommodated  in  the 
short  run  at  a  given  discount  rate.  To  the  extent 
that  reserve  demand  was  simply  accommodated,  re- 
serve  requirements  could  not  exercise  an  effective 
constraint  on  credit  expansion.  Reserve  require- 
ments  played  a  role  only  to  the  extent  that  Fed  non- 
price  rationing  at  the  discount  window  made  interest 
rates  rise  relative  to  the  discount  rate  as  discount 
window  borrowing  increased.  In  this  case,  an  in- 
crease  in  required  reserve  demand  associated  with 
an  increase  in  the  demand  for  credit  would  only  be 
accommodated  at  an  increased  spread  of  the  market 
interest  rate  over  the  discount  rate.  Since  Fed  non- 
price  rationing  at  the  discount  window  was  relatively 
weak  at  the  time,  required  reserves  at  best  played 
only  a  minor  role  in  restricting  credit  expansion  dur- 
ing  these  years. 
In  the  1930s  interest  rates  declined  to  a  fraction  of 
the  levels  they  had  averaged  in  the  192Os,  and  al- 
though  the  Federal  Reserve  discount  rate  also  fell,  it 
was  not  allowed  to  fall  as  far.  In  contrast  to  the 
period  between  1919  and  1931  when  the  discount 
rate  was  mainly  below  market  rates,  from  1934  on 
it  was  mainly  above  them.  As  a  result,  discounts 
were  negligible  in  the  latter  period,  and  the  discount 
rate  fell  into  disuse  as  an  instrument  of  credit  policy. 
Due  to  low  credit  demand  and  extremely  low  in- 
terest  rates  in  the  1930s  required  reserves  were  not 
needed  to  control  credit.  In  fact,  the  mid-1930s  was 
characterized  by  enormous  growth  in  excess  reserves 
relative  to  historical  levels.  These  abnormally  large 
excess  reserves  were  probably  due  to  a  combination 
of  very  low  interest  rates  and  increased  demand  for 
liquidity  due  to  the  banking  crises  of  the  early  1930s. 
At  any  rate,  Fed  officials  gradually  became  con- 
cerned  about  the  potential  inflationary  consequences 
of  the  large  volume  of  excess  reserves.  Using  its 
recently  acquired  power  to  change  reserve  require- 
ments,  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  doubled  reserve 
requirements  in  a  series  of  steps  in  1936-37  saying 
that  its  action  “was  in  the  nature  of  a  precautionary 
measure  to  prevent  an  uncontrollable  expansion  of 
credit  in  the  future.“13 
1s Board  of  Governors  [6]  1937, p.  2. 
The  Federal  Reserve  Board  first  acquired  the power  to 
change  reserve  requirements  in the  Thomas  Amendment 
to  the Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  of  1933.  That  legis- 
lation  authorized  the  Board,  subject  to  Presidential  ap- 
proval,  to  change  reserve  requirements  upon  declaration 
Given  the  Fed’s  judgment  of  the  advisability  of 
attempting  to  immobilize  excess  reserves,  its  decision 
to  raise  reserve  requirements  rather  than  sell  se- 
curities  from  its  portfolio  seems  justifiable.  At  the 
time  of  the  initial  reserve  requirement  increase  in 
August  1936  excess  reserves  were  approximately  3 
billion  dollars,  while  the  Fed’s  total  portfolio  of  earn- 
ing  assets,  by  then  essentially  government  securities, 
was  roughly  2.5  billion  dollarsi  As  a  matter  of 
arithmetic  then,  the  Fed  simply  did  not  have  enough 
securities  to  absorb  the  entire  volume  of  excess  re- 
serves  with  open  market  sales. 
Furthermore,  from  the  Fed’s  point  of  view,  there 
was  no  guarantee  that  excess  reserves  would  not 
continue  to  grow,  necessitating  further  security  sales. 
During  this  period  the  Fed  did  not  have  complete 
control  of  base  money  since  the  United  States  was 
on  a  gold  standard.  The  size  of  the  Fed’s  portfolio 
had  been  virtually  held  constant  from  1934  until  the 
end  of  the  decade  but  large  gold  inflows  had  financed 
the  increase  in  excess  reserves.  Even  if  the  Fed  had 
desired  to  absorb  only  a  portion  of  excess  reserve 
growth  with  open  market  sales,  continuing  gold  in- 
flow  could  have  eventually  exhausted  the  Fed’s  port- 
folio.  For  these  reasons  reserve  requirements,  and 
specifically  the  power  to  raise  them,  did  play  a useful 
role  in  the  Fed’s  effort  to  immobilize  excess  reserves 
in  this  period. 
In  summary,  the  role  played  by  reserve  require- 
ments  in  Fed  credit  policy  in  the  interwar  period 
varied  greatly.  From  the  early  years  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  through  the  1920s  the  Fed  relied  on 
the  discount  rate  as  its  primary  policy  instrument. 
Credit  conditions  were  managed  by  manipulating  the 
discount  rate;  but  credit,  money,  and  reserve  demand 
were  essentially  accommodated  at  a  given  discount 
rate  so  that  reserve  requirements  did  not  effectively 
restrain  credit  expansion  during  those  years.  As 
pointed  out  by  the  1931  Fed  Committee  on  Bank 
Reserves,  reserve  requirements  did  not  function  well 
to  restrain  credit  expansion  during  the  stock  market 
boom  of  1928-29.  In  the  1930s  credit  demand  was 
low,  excess  reserves  were  extremely  large,  and  re- 
quired  reserves  were  not  then  important  as  a  con- 
straint  on  credit  expansion.  However,  reserve 
requirements,  specifically  reserve  requirement  in- 
creases,  were  useful  in  the  Fed’s  effort  to  immobilize 
excess  reserves  which  it  then  regarded  as  excessive. 
of  an  emergency  due  to  credit  expansion.  The  Banking 
Act  of  1935 removed  the  need  for  Presidential  approval 
but  limited  reserve  requirement  changes  to  the  range 
between  their  existing  level  and  twice  that  level.  See 
Board  of  Governors  [ 121, p.  960. 
13 Board  of  Governors  [6]  1936, p. 74. -5- 
From  1942  until  the  Treasury-Federal  Reserve 
Accord  of  1951  the  Fed’s  credit  policy  became  a 
strict  bond  price  support  program.  By  supporting 
the  price  of  government  bonds,  i.e.,  holding  interest 
rates  down,  the  Fed  used  its  money-creating  power 
to  help  finance  wartime  needs.  Under  the  bond  price 
support  program  the  Fed  simply  bought  eligible 
government  securities  offered  to  it  at  the  pegged 
price.  Since  the  policy  was  deliberately  accommo- 
dative,  reserve  requirements  did  not  function  at  all 
during  this  period  to  restrain  credit  expansion. 
Monetary  Control 
Federal  Reserve  policy  statements  in  the  1950s 
shifted  from  almost  exclusive  concern  with  credit 
conditions  to  inclusion  of  the  money  stock  as  a  rele- 
vant  criterion  for  policy.  14  Since  then  the  monetary 
aggregates  have  become  increasingly  important  as 
guides  to  policy  and  by  the  late  1970s  Ml  became  the 
primary  intermediate  policy  target.  Increasing  con- 
cern  for  the  monetary  aggregates  during  this  period 
has  been  accompanied  by  a  widespread  belief  that 
reserve  requirements  have  been  useful  for  monetary 
control.  Reserve  requirements  can  contribute  signifi- 
cantly  to  monetary  control,  but  only  under  certain 
conditions.  As  explained  below,  these  conditions 
have  never  been  entirely  met  in  practice. 
The  belief  that  reserve  requirements  are  useful  for 
monetary  control  is  generally  based  on  the  “money 
multiplier”  model  of  money  stock  determination.15 
The  money  multiplier  is  essentially  a  relationship 
between  deposits  (D)  and  reserves  (R),  D  =  mR, 
where  m  is  called  the  money  multiplier.  If  banks 
keep  excess  reserves,  i.e.,  reserves  held  in  excess  of 
legal  requirements,  to  a  minimum  and  reserve  re- 
quirments  are  uniformly  and  solely  applied  to  de- 
posits,  then  the  multiplier  can  be  essentially  constant. 
In  this  case  the  Fed  can  exercise  close  control  of 
deposit  volume  through  close  control  of  reserves. 
Reserve  requirements  are  important  in  this  method 
of  monetary  control  because  they  make  the  multiplier 
more  stable. 
An  additional  condition,  frequently  either  taken 
for  granted  or  overlooked,  is  necessary  for  money 
stock  determination  to  work  as  described  above.  The 
Fed  must  maintain  control  of  reserves.  If  the  volume 
of  reserves  is  determined  by  banking  system  demand 
then  reserve  requirements  do  not  constrain  monetary 
expansion.  Reserve  demand  is  simply  accommodated 
and  required  reserves  serve  only  to  enlarge  the  de- 
14  Friedman  and  Schwartz  [28],  pp.  627-32 document  this 
shift  and  describe  it  as  a  “near-revolutionary  change.” 
15  For  a more  detailed  discussion  of  the money  multiplier 
see  Goodfriend  [30]. 
mand  for  reserves  at  any  given  level  of  deposits.  In 
this  case,  the  stock  of  deposits  is  determined  inde- 
pendently  of  reserve  requirements. 
In  practice,  the  Fed  has  never  adopted  operating 
procedures  designed  to  control  reserves  in  order  to 
use  the  money  multiplier  relationship  to  control  de- 
posits.  Throughout  much  of  the  1950s  and  1960s 
free  reserve  targeting  was  used  in  conjunction 
with  discount  rate  adjustments  to  execute  monetary 
policy.le  Restraint  was  achieved  by  lowering  the 
target  for  free  reserves  and  raising  the  discount  rate  ; 
expansion  was  encouraged  by  raising  the  free  reserve 
target  and  lowering  the  discount  rate.  Free  reserves 
and  the  discount  rate  fell  into  disuse  in  the  early 
1970s  as  operating  variables.  At  that  time,  the 
Federal  funds  rate  emerged  as  the  primary  policy 
instrument.  Monetary  control  was  exercised  with 
the  funds  rate  instrument  by  raising  the  rate  to  re- 
strain  money  growth  and  lowering  it  when  more 
rapid  money  growth  was  desired. 
Operating  procedures  utilizing  free  reserves  and 
the  discount  rate  on  one  hand  or  the  Federal  funds 
rate  on  the  other  are  essentially  accommodative. 
They  operate,  as  did  the  discount  rate  operating  pro- 
cedure  of  the  192Os,  by  influencing  the  general  level 
of  short-term  interest  rates  in  order  to  affect  the 
quantity  of  money  and  credit  demanded.17  With 
these  operating  procedures,  reserves  are  merely  sup- 
plied  as  required  to  support  the  quantity  of  money 
and  credit  demanded  given  the  operating  target.  A 
1971  Federal  Reserve  Board  Staff  Study  acknowl- 
edged  the  accommodative  nature  of  these  operating 
procedures  : 
The  operating  emphasis  on  money  market  condi- 
tions  has  meant  that  the  [Fed]  was  essentially 
accommodative,  in  the  sense  that  market.  demands 
for  credit  and  money  would  be  accommodated  at  a 
given  Federal  funds  rate  or  level  of  net  borrowed 
or  net  free  reserves.ls 
Since  both  the  free  reserve/discount  rate  and  Federal 
funds  rate  operating  procedures  are  accommodative, 
1s Free  reserves  are  defined  as  excess  reserves  minus 
borrowed  reserves,  or  equivalently  nonborrowed  reserves 
minus  required  reserves.  Net  borrowed  reserves  are 
negative  free  reserves.  For  a  Federal  Reserve  view  of 
free  reserves  as  an  operating  target  see  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of  New  York  [26]. 
17 Details  of  the free reserve/discount  rate, Federal  funds 
rate,. and  discount  rate  operating  procedures  can  be  in- 
vestlgated  within  the  framework  developed  by  Good- 
friend  [30].  See  McCallum  [35]  for  an  analysis  of  the 
feasibility  of  an  interest  rate  policy  rule  under  rational 
expectations.  Friedman  and  Schwartz  [ZS],  pp.  615-16 
and  Meigs  [36]  point  out  the  accommodative  nature  of 
free  reserve  targeting.  Friedman  and  Schwartz  [28],  p. 
223  make  a  similar  point  about  the  discount  rate  oper- 
ating  procedure  of  the  1920s. 
18  Axilrod  [Z],  p.  6. -6- 
reserve  requirements  did  not  exercise  an  effective 
constraint  on  monetary  expansion  during  the  post- 
Accord  period  in  which  these  operating  procedures 
were  utilized.ls 
In  October  1979,  the  Fed  adopted  a  nonborrowed 
reserve  operating  procedure.  The  move  to  nonbor- 
rowed  reserves  could  have  given  reserve  requirements 
a  significant  role  in  controlling  money  if  reserve 
requirements  had  been  contemporaneous.20  How- 
ever,  reserve  requirements  have  been  computed  on  a 
lagged  basis  since  September  1968.  With  a  nonbor- 
rowed  reserve  instrument  and  lagged  reserve  require- 
ments,  the  Fed’s  operating  target  within  a  reserve 
statement  week  has  essentially  been  net  borrowed 
reserves,  i.e.,  negative  free  reserves.  To  see  this, 
recall  that  net  borrowed  reserves  equals  the  difference 
between  required  reserves  and  nonborrowed  reserves. 
With  a  nonborrowed  reserve  instrument  the  Fed 
supplies  a  predetermined  volume  of  nonborrowed 
reserves  each  reserve  statement  week  ;  and  under 
lagged  reserve  requirements  required  reserves  are 
known  at  the  beginning  of  each  reserve  statement 
week.  Therefore,  operating  with  a  nonborrowed 
reserve  instrument  and  lagged  reserve  requirements 
amounts  to  targeting  net  borrowed  reserves  in  any 
given  reserve  statement  week.  As  pointed  out  above, 
net  borrowed  or  free  reserve  targeting  is  accommo- 
dative  ;  so  even  after  the  adoption  of  a  nonborrowed 
reserve  instrument  in  1979,  reserve  requirements 
still  do  not  exercise  an  effective  constraint  on  mone- 
tary  expansion.21 
While  it  is  true  that  net  borrowed  reserve  and 
nonborrowed  reserve  targeting  with  lagged  reserve 
19 It  has  been  argued  that  even  though  reserve  demand 
has  been  accommodated,  the  effectiveness  of  the  funds 
rate operating  procedure  may  have been  enhanced  by  the 
imposition  of  reserve  requirements  on  transaction  de- 
posits  in  the  following  sense:  For  targeting  transaction 
balances,  if  the  implicit  own  rate  on  transaction  deposits 
was  competitively  determined,  then  noninterest-earning 
reserve  requirements  on  transaction  deposits  increased 
the  sensitivity  to  the  level  of  market  rates  of  the  rate 
spread  between  transaction  deposits  and  alternative  in- 
struments  paying  a  market  rate,  allowing  manipulation 
of  the  funds  rate  instrument  to  more  readilv  influence 
ihe  quantity  of  transaction  balances  demanded.  How- 
ever,  although  the  implicit  own  rate  on  transaction  de- 
posits  may  have  moved  over  time  with  the  general  level 
of  interest  rates,  for  the  most  part  it  probably  has  not 
moved  comoetitivelv  in  immediate  response  to  the  level 
of market  rates.  Tha  spread between  rates on  transaction 
deposits  and  alternative  instruments  paying  a  market 
rate  has  therefore  likely  moved  with  the  level  of  interest 
rates  apart  from  the  i&position  of  reserve  requirements 
on  transaction  deposits. 
20 See  Goodfriend  [30]  for  a  discussion  of  monetary 
control  with  a nonborrowed  reserve  instrument  and  con- 
temporaneous  reserve  requirements. 
2l Goodfriend  [31]  explains  why  with  lagged  reserve 
requirements,  a  Federal  funds  rate  instrument  can  pro- 
vide  better  monetary  control  than a nonborrowed  reserve 
instrument. 
requirements  are  identical  within  a  reserve  statement 
week,  they  are  different  in  their  dynamic  response  to 
money  stock  targeting  error,  i.e.,  deviations  of  the 
money  stock  from  target,  in  the  following  sense.  If, 
for  example,  the  money  stock  comes  in  above  target 
in  a  given  reserve  statement  week,  then  two  weeks 
later,  given  an  unchanged  nonborrowed  reserve  path, 
the  banking  system  is  forced  to  obtain  additional  re- 
quired  reserves  at  the  discount  window.  Given  the 
nonprice  rationing  at  the  discount  window,  addi- 
tional  discount  window  borrowing  raises  the  Federal 
funds  rate  (for  a  given  discount  rate)  and  thereby 
tends  to  bring  the  money  stock  back  to  target.  By 
contrast,  with  a  predetermined  net  borrowed  rather 
than  nonborrowed  reserve  path,  no  automatic  mech- 
anism  exists  to  bring  the  money  stock  back  to  target. 
In  short,  nonborrowed  reserve  targeting  with 
lagged  reserve  requirements  utilizes  a  feedback  rule 
to  automatically  adjust  the  weekly  net  borrowed 
reserve  path  in  response  to  money  stock  targeting 
error.  In  its  pure  form,  the  rule  feeds  changes  in 
required  reserve  demand  due  to  money  stock  target- 
ing  error  dollar  for  dollar  into  net  borrowed  reserves. 
But  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  feedback  rule  is 
expressed  in  terms  of  required  reserves,  actual  impo- 
sition  of  reserve  requirements  on  deposits  is  not 
essential  to  the  implementation  of  the  feedback  rule. 
As  explained  above,  the  feedback  rule  is  a mechanism 
designed  to  produce  a  particular  Federal  funds  rate 
movement  in  response  to  money  stock  targeting 
error.  Under  lagged  reserve  requirements  the  Fed- 
eral  funds  rate  response  based  on  reserve  require- 
ments  is  delayed  two  weeks.  But  by  that  time,  the 
Fed  itself  already  has  an  observation  on  the  two- 
week-old  money  stock  targeting  error.  This  means 
that  the  Fed  can  base  feedback  to  the  Federal  funds 
rate  directly  on  measured  two-week-old  money  stock 
targeting  error.  22  In  other  words,  the  dynamic  re- 
sponse  to  money  stock  targeting  error  under  the 
current  nonborrowed  reserve-lagged  reserve  require- 
ments  monetary  control  procedure  could  be  dupli- 
cated  without  imposition  of  reserve  requirements. 
In  1980  Congress  passed  the  Monetary  Control 
22 In  practice,  substantial  and frequent  adjustment  of  the 
discount  rate  has  been  utilized  to  augment  or  offset  the 
automatic  interest rate response  to money  stock  targeting 
error described  in the text.  The  post-October  1979 oper- 
ating  procedure,  utilizing  net  boriowed  reserve  targeting 
and  discount  rate  adjustments,  resembles  the  free 
reserve/discount  rate  operating  procedure  utilized  in  the 
1950s and  1960s and  also,  to  a  large  extent,  the  discount 
rate operating  procedure  of  the  1920s.  The  post-October 
1979 operating  procedure  differs  from  the  others  to  the 
extpnt  that  it  emnlovs  an  automatic  mechanism  for  ad- 
justing  the  net  b&rowed  reserve  target  in  response  to 
money  stock  targeting  error.  Goodfriend  [29]  discusses 
some  shortcomings  of  this  automatic  adjustment  mech- 
anism  as  it  has  been  employed. -  7 
Act  (MCA)  which  extensively  reformed  the  struc- 
ture  of  reserve  requirements.  This  legislation  grew 
out  of  several  years  of  proposals  and  debates  on  the 
problem  of  Fed  membership  attrition.  The  Fed’s 
share  of  banks  had  dropped  approximately  from  50 
percent  in  1950  to  40  percent  in  1976,  and  member 
banks’  share  of  gross  deposits  had  fallen  approxi- 
mately  from  86  percent  to  74  percent  in  the  same 
period,  with  the  loss  of  members  and  deposits  appar- 
ently  accelerating.23  The  cost  of  membership  was 
primarily  due  to  the  Fed’s  noninterest-earning  re- 
serve  requirement  which  put  member  banks  at  a 
competitive  disadvantage  relative  to  nonmembers 
who  generally  had  lower  reserve  requirements  and 
were  allowed  to  hold  interest-earning  assets  as  re- 
serves.24  This  disadvantage  had  increased  over  the 
previous  two  decades  with  the  rise  in  inflation  and 
interest  rates. 
The  Fed  argued  that  its  ability  to  control  the 
monetary  aggregates  was  weakening  as  deposits 
moved  outside  its  reserve  requirement  jurisdiction.25 
The  solution  adopted  by  Congress  in  the  MCA  was 
to  make  reserve  requirements  universal,  that  is,  to 
require  all  depository  institutions,  whether  members 
of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  or  not,  to  hold  re- 
serves  in  accordance  with  Fed  requirements.  In 
addition,  reserve  requirements  were  made  more  uni- 
form.26  These  are  the  reforms  in  the  MCA  which 
are  meant  to  improve  monetary  control.  It  should 
be  noted,  however,  in  light  of  the  discussion  above, 
that  the  structure  of  reserve  requirements  has  been 
basically  irrelevant  to  monetary  control  as  carried 
ss “The  Burden  of  Federal  Reserve  Membership  .  .  .” 
[16],  pp.  2-3. 
24 See  Federal  Reserve  Committee  on  Branch,.  Group, 
and  Chain  Banking  [27];  Wingfield  [68];  White  [66], 
pp.  5-9;  and  Benston  [S],  Chapter  III,  for  discussions  of 
the  costs  and  benefits  of  Federal  Reserve  membershin. 
“The  Burden  of  Federal  Reserve  Membership  . . .”  [16], 
Appendix  A,  contains  a detailed discussion  of  nonmember 
bank  reserve  requirements. 
2s See  for  example,  testimony  by  Chairmen  of  the  Fed- 
eral Reserve  Board:  Arthur  F.  Burns  in U.  S.  Congress, 
Senate  [61],  p.  3.5; G.  William  Miller  in  U.  S.  Congress, 
House  l-523,  pp.  96-98  and  in  U.  S.  Congress,  Senate 
[60],  pp.  17, 21-22;  and  Paul  A.  Volcker  in  U.  S.  Con- 
gress,  Senate  [SS],  pp.  8-10,  35. 
2s The  Monetary  Control  Act  of  1980 requires  depository 
institutions,  after a gradual  phase-in  period,  to maintain  a 
reserve  equal  to: 
i)  3  percent  of  the  first  25  million  dollars  of  total 
transaction  accounts. 
ii)  12 percent-or  in  the  range  of  8-14  percent  as  the 
Board  may  prescribe-of  transaction  accounts  in 
excess  of  25 million  dollars. 
iii)  3  percent-or  in  the  range  of  O-9 percent  as  the 
Board  may  prescribe-of  nonpersonal  time  de- 
posits. 
See  Board  of  Governors  [lo]  for  a  summary  of  the 
MCA,  and  Board  of  Governors  [lS],  Regulation  D. 
out  with  the  post-October  1979  nonborrowed  reserve- 
lagged  reserve  requirements  operating  procedure. 
Recently,  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  announced  its 
intention  to  return  to  contemporaneous  reserve  re- 
quirements,  This  commitment  is  an  important  first 
step  toward  a  reserve-based  operating  procedure  in 
which  the  reserve  requirement  reforms  embodied  in 
the  MCA  could  significantly  improve  monetary  con- 
troL2’ 
III. 
FINANCING  CONSIDERATIONS  AND 
RESERVE  REQUIREMENT  LEGISLATION 
The  preceding  discussion  explained  that  reserve 
requirements  have  rarely  functioned  as  indicated  in 
the  standard  rationales.  On  the  other  hand,  reserve 
requirements  have  consistently  functioned  to  help 
finance  the  United  States  Treasury.  Furthermore, 
financing  considerations  have  substantially  influenced 
reserve  requirement  legislation  throughout  the  his- 
tory  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
The  first  part  of  this  section  explains  that  reserve 
requirement  reform  in  the  early  years  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  was  largely  designed  to  enhance  the 
Fed’s  power  to  create  base  money  in  order  to  provide 
reserves  to  the  banking  system  through  the  redis- 
count  mechanism,  to  meet  its  own  financial  needs, 
and  to  finance  United  States  participation  in  World 
War  I.  The  second  part  describes  the  origin  and 
development  of  the  systematic  transfer  of  net  Fed 
earnings  to  the  Treasury.  Lastly,  this  section  covers 
recent  reserve  requirement  reform,  focusing  on  con- 
cern  for  the  Fed  membership  problem  and  the  influ- 
ence  of  Treasury  revenue  considerations  in  the  draft- 
ing  of  the  Monetary  Control  Act  of  1980. 
Early  Reserve  Requirement  Reform  Under 
the  Federal  Reserve  System 
One  of  the  major  features  of  the  reorganization  of 
the  banking  system  under  the  Federal  Reserve  Act 
was  the  requirement  that  member  banks  hold  re- 
quired  reserves  in  the  form  of  deposits  with  Federal 
Reserve  Banks.  As  mentioned  above,  the  rule  that 
member  banks  hold  required  reserves  as  vault  cash 
or  with  Federal  Reserve  Banks  was  designed  to 
eliminate  pyramiding.  More  importantly  for  the  issue 
at  hand,  the  requirement  centralized  gold  reserves 
in  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks.  The  first  installment 
of  the  initial  transfer  of  member  bank  reserves  to  the 
27 Goodfriend  [30,  311  describes  how  a  move  to  con- 
temporaneous  reserve  requirements  could  improve  mone- 
tary  control. -8- 
Reserve  Banks  consisted  entirely  of  lawful  money 
(gold  or  money  that  the  Treasury  would  exchange 
for  gold).  At  least  one-half  of  each  subsequent  trans- 
fer  was  in  lawful  money;  the  rest  was  receivable  in 
certain  eligible  paper.28 
The  Reserve  Banks  themselves  were  initially  re- 
quired  to  keep  a  35  percent  reserve  in  lawful  money 
against  deposits  and  a  40  percent  reserve  against 
Federal  Reserve  notes.  The  fact  that  the  initial 
transfer  of  member  bank  reserves  to  the  Reserve 
Banks  averaged  more  than  50  percent  lawful  money 
meant  that  the  volume  of  deposit  and  note  liabilities 
which  the  Reserve  Banks  could  create  was  not  ini- 
tially  constrained  by  their  lawful  money  reserve  re- 
quirement.*”  The  centralization  of  gold  reserves  in 
the  Reserve  Banks,  together  with  their  initially  in- 
effective  reserve  requirement  constraint  and  the 
power  to  rediscount  or  purchase  securities,  gave 
the  Federal  Reserve  System  the  power  to  create 
additional  deposit  or  note  liabilities,  i.e.,  base  money, 
in  exchange  for  earning  assets.  As  mentioned  earlier, 
the  power  to  provide  reserves  to  the  banking  system, 
particularly  in  times  of  stress,  was  viewed  as  a  much 
needed  provision  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act. 
2s Section  19 of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  of  1913 directed 
member  banks  to  make  an initial  transfer  of  a portion  of 
their required  reserves  to  the  Reserve  Banks  at  the  time 
of  the  establishment  of  the  Reserve  Banks.  Three  sub- 
sequent  installments  were  to  be  made  at  six-month 
intervals  starting  twelve  months  after  the  first  install- 
ment.  Section  19 also  specified  that  no  more  than  half 
of  each  installment  was  to  consist  of  eligible  paper;  the 
rest  was  receivable  in  gold  or  lawful  money.  See  “Fed- 
eral  Reserve  Act  of  1913”  [24],  p.  40.  This  provision 
appears  to  have  been  superseded  by  Federal  Reserve 
Board  Circular  No.  10 of  October  28, 1914 which  directed 
that  the  first  installment,  due  November  16,  1914,  be 
made  entirely  in  gold  or  lawful  money.  See  Board  of 
Governors  [6]  1914,  p.  167.  Subsequent  installments 
were  made  on  November  16,  1915;  May  16,  1916;  and 
November  16,  1916.  The  Board  of  Governors  Annual 
Report  1916 incorrectly  reports  an  installment  as  having 
been  made  on  Mav  16.  1915.  See  Board  of  Governors 
[6]  1916, p.  22  and  Commercial  and  Financial  Chronicle 
[19]  November  6,  1915, p.  1515.  Federal  Reserve  Board 
notices  prior  to the second  and fourth  installments  reiter- 
ated  that  no  more  than  half  of  each  installment  was  re- 
ceivable  in  eligible  paper.  See  Board  of  Governors  [11] 
November  1915, p. 361 and  November  1916, pp.  597-98. 
29  The  only  time  that  Reserve  Bank  lawful  money  re- 
serve  requirements  were  allowed  to  seriously  constrain 
Federal  Reserve  credit  exoansion  was  in  the  oeriod  im- 
mediately  following  World  War  I.  See  Friehman  and 
Schwartz  [28],  pp.  229-31.  The  next  time  that  Reserve 
Bank  reserve  requirements  threatened  to  constrain  the 
exoansion  of  Federal  Reserve  credit.  during  World  War 
II;  they  were  reduced  to  25  percent  on  ‘both  Reserve 
Bank  deposit  and  note  liabilities.  Finally,  the  last  time 
that  Reserve  Bank  reserve  requirements  threatened  to 
constrain  Fed  credit  expansion,  this  time  in  the  mid- 
196Os, they  were  reduced  to  zero.  See  Board  of  Gover- 
nors  [8],  pp.  328-29  and  [9],  pp.  464-65.  Reserve  Bank 
reserve  requirements  were  reduced  first  to  enable  the 
Fed  to  continue  to  expand  credit  and  help  finance  U.  S. 
participation  in  World  War  II,  and  finally  to  make  gold 
available  to  help  finance  the  U.  S.  balance  of  payments 
deficit  without  constraining  Fed  credit  expansion. 
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  it  was  not 
technically  necessary  that  member  banks  hold  re- 
serves  in  the  form  of  deposits  at  Reserve  Banks 
either  to  eliminate  pyramiding  or  to  give  the  Fed 
power  to  create  base  money.  Pyramiding  could  have 
been  largely  eliminated  by  simply  mandating  that 
banks  hold  required  reserves  in  their  own  vaults, 
though  pyramiding  of  voluntary  correspondent  bal- 
ances  might  have  been  greater  in  the  absence  of 
correspondent  services  available  at  the  Fed.  Further- 
more,  availability  of  reserves  at  the  Fed  discount 
window  alone  could  have  remedied  monetary  prob- 
lems  stemming  from  pyramiding  and  for  that  matter 
could  also  in  principle  have  vitiated  any  liquidity 
rationale  for  reserve  requirements.30  Reserve  Banks 
could  have  been  given  the  power  to  rediscount  or 
purchase  securities  without  having  to  hold  member 
bank  reserves,  although  the  gold  reserve  acquired  by 
the  Reserve  Banks  was  probably  useful  in  giving  the 
appearance  of  adhering  to  conventional  banking  prac- 
tice.  However,  reserve  requirements  on  member 
bank  deposits  were  not  even  necessary  for  the  Fed 
to  acquire  gold,  since  Reserve  Banks  could  in  prin- 
ciple  have  acquired  gold  by  offering  attractive  interest 
rates  on  deposits. 
At  any  rate,  initially  the  Fed’s  power  to  create 
base  money  and  acquire  earning  assets  was  primarily 
useful  to  the  Fed  itself.  The  advantages  to  the  Fed 
were  twofold.  First,  income  from  a  portfolio  of 
securities  made  the  Reserve  Banks  financially  self- 
sufficient.  Second,  possession  of  a portfolio  of  securi- 
ties  allowed  the  Reserve  Banks  to  more  effectively 
influence  or  stabilize  the  money  market.  These  ob- 
jectives  were  acknowledged  in  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board’s  Annual  Report  of  1914: 
The  Reserve  Banks  have  expenses  to  meet,  and 
while  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  regard  them  merely 
as  profit-making  concerns  and  to  apply  to  them 
the  ordinary  test  of  business  success,  there  is  no 
reason  why  they  should  not  earn  their  expenses, 
and  a  fair  profit  besides,  without  failing  to  exer- 
cise  their  proper  functions  and  exceeding  the 
bounds  of  prudence  in  their  management.  More- 
over!  the  Reserve  Banks  can  never  become  the 
leading  and  important  factor  in  the  money  market 
which  they  were  designed  to  be  unless  a  consider- 
able  portion  of  their  resources  is  regularly  and 
constantly  employed.31 
The  first  reserve  requirement  reform  following  the 
Federal  Reserve  Act  was  made  in  1917.  The  1917 
reform  amended  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  to  specify 
that  vault  cash  could  no  longer  count  as  required 
reserves.  This  provision  by  itself  would  have  raised 
30 Related  issues  are  discussed  in  Sargent  and  Wallace 
c431. 
31 Board  of  Governors  [6]  1914, p.  18. -9- 
total  reserve  demand  since  banks  still  needed  to  hold 
vault  cash,  but  the  reform  also  significantly  lowered 
reserve  requirements,  making  it  more  acceptable  to 
member  banks.3”  The  main  purpose  of  the  1917 
reform  was  to  further  concentrate  gold  at  Reserve 
Banks  by  removing  the  incentive  for  member  banks 
to  hold  gold  as  vault  cash.  Prior  to  1917,  vault  cash 
could  be  used  to  partially  satisfy  reserve  require- 
ments.  However,  neither  Federal  Reserve  notes  nor 
National  Bank  notes  could  be  counted  as  required 
reserves.  As  a  result,  a  large  portion  of  the  country’s 
gold  holdings  was  absorbed  in  the  form  of  vault  cash 
at  member  banks.  The  concentration  of  gold  at  the 
Fed  was  undertaken  to  ensure  that  Reserve  Bank 
gold  reserves  would  not  constrain  the  Fed’s  ability 
to  accommodate  the  large  demands  for  credit  ex- 
pected  to  arise  out  of  the  country’s  entry  into  World 
War  1.33 
As  it  turned  out,  United  States  participation  in 
World  War  I  and  the  large  Federal  deficits  that 
accompanied  it  did  precipitate  the  first  major  use  of 
the  Fed’s  power  to  create  base  money.  Though  most 
of  the  Federal  deficit  was  covered  by  sales  of  U.  S. 
bonds  to  banks  and  the  public,  the  Reserve  Banks 
held  interest  rates  down  by  keeping  their  discount 
rates  low  and  accommodating  credit  demand  at  these 
rates.  In  this  sense,  the  Fed  used  its  money-creating 
power  to  help  finance  bank,  public,  and  Treasury 
credit  needs  in  World  War  I. 
Fed-Treasury  Transfers 
The  power  to  purchase  and  rediscount  securities  in 
exchange  for  its  own  noninterest-earning  liabilities 
gave  the  Fed  a  means  of  earning  substantial  income. 
During  the  drafting  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  it 
was  recognized  that  this  income  would  generally 
exceed  operating  expenses  and  payment  of  dividends 
to  “stockllolders.“34  Accordingly,  Section  7  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  Act  specified  how  net  earnings  were 
to  be  distributed.  Specifically,  Congress  directed  the 
Fed  to  pay  the  Treasury  a  “franchise  tax”  equal  to 
32  Reserve  requirements  were  reduced  to  13,  10,  and  7 
percent  on  demand  deposits  for  central  reserve  city, 
reserve  city,  and  country  member  banks  respectively,  and 
to  3  percent  on  time  deposits  at  all  member  banks.  See 
Eox”,,  of  Governors  [IZ],  p.  959;  also  see  Cagan  [17], 
33  For  Federal  Reserve  statements  of  the  motivation  for 
the legislation  see Board  of  Governors  [6]  1917, pp.  11-12 
and  [ll]  July  1917, pp.  508-9. 
34 Reserve  Bank  stock  is merely  a required  payment  to  a 
Reserve  Bank  that  goes  with  Federal  Reserve  member- 
ship.  Although  Reserve  Bank  stock  pays  a  fixed  6 
nercent  dividend.  it  carries  with  it  virtuallv  none  of  the 
&sponsibilities  And  entitlements  of  comhercial  stock 
issue.  See  Federal  Reserve  Act  as  Amended  .  .  .  [23], 
Sections  2,  5, and  7. 
one-half  of  net  earnings  after  expenses  and  payment 
of  dividends.  The  other  half  of  net  earnings  was  to 
be  paid  into  a surplus  fund  until  it  equaled  40  percent 
of paid-in  capital  stock  at  the  Reserve  Banks.35  After 
surplus  reached  40  percent  of  paid-in  capital,  net 
earnings  were  to  go  entirely  to  the  Treasury.  The 
reasoning  behind  the  franchise  tax  can  be  found  in 
the  House  Report  on  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  which 
says  : 
it is  obvious  that  the  function  of  note  issue  will 
i&t  in  a  large  volume  of  earnings  which  the 
Federal  reserve  banks  could  not  enjoy  were  they  to 
share  this  power  with  other  banking  institutions. 
To  a  substantial  share  in  this  earning,  leaving  for 
the  reserve  banks  only  a  fair  compensation  for 
their  services  in  taking  out  the  notes,  the  public  is 
evidently  entitled.30 
Legislators  also  recognized  that  requiring  member 
banks  to  hold  noninterest-earning  reserves  at  Federal 
Reserve  Banks  would  provide  an  additional  source 
of  earnings  for  the  Fed.  The  question  of  whether  or 
not  to  pay  interest  on  required  reserves  at  the  Fed 
was  discussed  during  the  drafting  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  Acts3’  Ultimately,  the  Federal  Reserve  Act 
itself  was  silent  on  this  issue,  though  the  Senate 
Report  on  the  Act  says  that  “reserves  placed  with 
the  Federal  reserve  banks  would  not  bear  interest 
under  the  present  bill  (although  this  may  possibly  be 
found  expedient  at  some  future  time  when  the  system 
is  established)  .“3* 
Legislation  passed  in  1919  amended  Section  7  to 
require  that  all  net  earnings  be  added  to  surplus  until 
it  amounted  to  100  percent  of  subscribed  capital 
(which  is  twice  paid-in  capital)  after  which  10  per- 
cent  of  net  earnings  was  to  be  added  to  surplus  and 
90  percent  paid  as  a  franchise  tax.3g  The  surplus 
deemed  appropriate  was  thereby  quintupled  as  mea- 
sured  relative  to  paid-in  capital  just  a few  years  after 
35 Surplus  is  employed  in  commercial  enterprises  as  a 
reserve  for  contingencies  such  as  absorbing  losses  or 
meeting  expenses  and  dividends  when  earnings  are  low. 
Board  of  Governors  [S],  p.  356  lists  charges  against 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  surplus  from  1914  through  1941. 
Board  of  Governors  [9],  p.  SO1 and  [7],  pp.  450-69 
provide  less  detailed  information  on  the  disposition  of 
surplus  from  1942  to  1979.  More  information  on  the 
disposition  of  surplus  may  be  found  in  various  Board  of 
Governors  Annual  Reports.  Although  it  is  not  clear 
how  the  level  of  surplus  deemed  appropriate  for  the 
Reserve  Banks  was  determined,  or why  the  Fed,  with  its 
power  to  create  money,  was  expected  to  need  surplus  at 
all,  maintaining  surplus  held  as  securities  has  enabled 
the Fed  to meet contingencies  without  affecting  the stock 
of  base  money. 
313  U.  S.  Congress,  House  [48],  p.  39. 
37 See,  for  example,  Congressional  Record  [21]  Part  1, 
pp.  451-54  and  Part  17, p.  562. 
3s U.  S.  Congress,  Senate  [54],  p.  12. 
39 See  U.  S.  Congress,  Senate  [5.5],  p.  18. -  10  - 
the  Federal  Reserve  Act  was  passed.  The  House 
Report  on  the  1919  amendment  says  that  this  was 
necessary  because  the  large  expansion  of  Federal 
Reserve  credit  during  World  War  I  warranted  a 
larger  surplus  to  give  the  Reserve  Banks  added 
strength.  Wartime  credit  expansion  did  enormously 
increase  member  bank  assets,  liabilities,  and  reserve 
balances  at  the  Fed.  But  it  also  correspondingly 
raised  member  bank  capital  structure,  and  the  re- 
quirement  that  each  member  bank’s  subscription  to 
Reserve  Bank  capital  stock  be  maintained  at  6  per- 
cent  of  its  own  capital  stock  meant  that  increased 
member  bank  reserves  at  the  Fed  would  be  accom- 
panied  by  a  proportionate  increase  in  paid-in  and 
surplus  capital. 
However,  as  a  result  of  an  increase  in  the  demand 
for  Federal  Reserve  notes  as  currency  and,  to  some 
extent,  the  exchange  of  Federal  Reserve  notes  for 
gold  certificates  during  the  war,  capital  fell  from  5.8 
percent  of  total  Reserve  Bank  liabilities  at  the  end  of 
1914  to  2  percent  at  the  end  of  1918.40  Quintupling 
the  ratio  of  surplus  to  paid-in  capital  roughly  re- 
stored  the  1914  ratio  of  capital  to  total  Reserve  Bank 
liabilities.  Reserve  Bank  portfolios  and  earnings  had 
grown  so  large  as  a  result  of  discount  policy  during 
World  War  I  that  some  Reserve  Banks  were  imme- 
diately  able  to  raise  surplus  to  100  percent  of  sub- 
scribed  capital,  and  the  Fed  transferred  3  million 
dollars  to  the  Treasury  in  1919.  Transfers  to  the 
Treasury  during  the  following  two  years  were  in  the 
neighborhood  of  60  million  dollars,  the  largest  by  far 
until  after  World  War  II. 
As  the  table  indicates,  Fed-Treasury  transfers  have 
continued  almost  without  interruption,  though  under 
varying  labels,  to  this  day.41  Transfers  were  made 
under  the  franchise  tax  designation  from  1914  until 
1932.  Congress  abolished  the  franchise  tax  in  the 
Banking  Act  of  1933.  That  legislation  also  created 
the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC) 
and  required  the  Reserve  Banks  to  subscribe  an 
amount  equal  to  one-half  their  accumulated  surplus, 
139  million  dollars,  for  FDIC  stock.42  As  compen- 
sation,  the  Reserve  Banks  were  allowed  to  retain  all 
subsequent  net  earnings  to  rebuild  surplus.  How- 
ever,  transfers  to  the  Treasury  were  partially  re- 
40 See  Board  of  Governors  [8],  pp.  330, 409;  and  Willis 
[67],  p.  1440. 
41  Barro  [4]  discusses  and  measures  Fed  revenue  from 
money  creation.  Note  that  his  tables  report  gross  while 
ours  reports  net revenue.  For  more  detail on  the sources 
and  uses  of  Fed  earnings  see  Board  of  Governors  [8], 
p.  3.56;  [9],  p.  501;  and  [7],  pp.  450-69.  See  Auern- 
heimer  [l]  and references  contained  therein  for  theoreti- 
cal  discussions  of  the revenue  from  money  creation. 
42 Board  of  Governors  [6]  1947, pp.  83-84. 
sumed  in  1935  under  a  newly  created  Section  13b  of 
the  Federal  Reserve  Act  which  permitted  the  Reserve 
Banks  to  make  “industrial”  loans.  Fed-Treasury 
transfers  under  Section  13b  were  relatively  insignifi- 
cant  and  transfers  under  that  designation  were  ter- 
minated  in  October  1947.43 
Larger  Fed-Treasury  transfers  were  resumed  in 
1947  under  the  so-called  “interest  on  Federal  Re- 
serve  notes”  designation.  The  events  that  led  to  this 
means  of  Fed-Treasury  transfers  are  as  follows. 
Although  the  World  War  II  bond  price  support 
program  remained  essentially  in  effect  until  the  1951 
Accord,  the  Fed  favored  higher  Treasury  bill  interest 
rates  after  the  war  in  order  to  help  restrain  credit 
expansion.  The  problem  from  the  Fed’s  point  of 
view  was  clearly  summarized  by  Federal  Reserve 
Board  Chairman  Eccles  in  an  April  1947  meeting  of 
the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee  (FOMC)  : 
Chairman  Eccles  stated  that  he  had  come  to  the 
conclusion  that,  if  any  progress  was  to  be  made 
with  the  Treasury  in  getting  an  agreement  to  dis- 
continue  the  posted  rate  on  Treasury  bills  and  to 
permit  the  bill  rate  to  rise  to  a  level  which  would 
be  determined  by  the  market  in  line  with  the  7/8 
percent  rate  on  certificates,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  present  to  the  Treasury  a  program  pursuant  to 
which  the  increased  cost  of  Treasury  financing 
that  might  result  from  the  changed  bill  program 
would  be  offset  by  paying  into  the  Treasury  a 
substantial  portion  of  the  net  earnings  of  the  Re- 
serve  Banks.  He  thought  that  the  Treasury  would 
not  be willing  to  agree  now  to  eliminate  the  posted 
rate  on  the  basis  of  the  introduction  and  passage 
of  legislation  to  restore  the  franchise  tax  which 
probably  would  require  a  number  of  months,  and 
that  therefore  the  Board  of  Governors  should 
immediately  prescribe  an  interest  rate  on  Federal 
Reserve  notes  under  the  provisions  of  the  fourth 
paragraph  of  Section  16  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
Act,  the  first  payment  to  be  made  to  the  Treasury 
in  April  on  Federal  Reserve  notes  outstanding 
during  the  first  quarter  of  the  year.  If  this  were 
done,  he  said,  then  the  Treasury  could  agree  to  a 
higher  rate  on  Treasury  bills  with  the  assurance 
that  the  increased  interest  cost  would  be  returned 
to  the  Treasury  in  the  form  of  interest  payments 
on  Federal  Reserve  notes.44 
At  the  same  meeting  Allan  Sproul,  President  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York,  stated  that: 
.  .  .  in  his  opinion  the  primary  purpose  of  the 
[Board’s]  authority  to  impose  an  interest  charge 
on  Federal  Reserve  notes  uncovered  by  gold  was 
the  belief  that  this  authority  could  be  used  to 
restrict  the  circulation  of  such  notes  and  thus  to 
restrain  inflationary  tendencies  and  there  was  a 
real  question  as  to  whether  Congress  intended  the 
authority  to  be  used  in  the  manner  proposed.4s 
However,  he  went  on  to  say  that: 
4s See  Hackley  [32],  pp.  133-45 for  a  discussion  of  Sec- 
tion  13b;  also  see Board  of  Governors  [6]  1947, pp. 83-84. 
44 Board  of  Governors  [14]  1947, 4/l/47,  p.  69. 
4s Ibid.,  p.  74. -  11  - 
FED-TREASURY  TRANSFERS 
Fed Payments  to 
U. S. Treasurv’ 
Federal 
Government 
Receipts** 
Fed Payments 
as o  Percent 
of  Federal 
Government 
YeCtr  ($  billions)  ($ biliionr)  Receipts 
1917 
18 
19 
.OOl 
.003 
1920  .061 
21  .060 
22  .Oll 
23  .004 
24  .OOOl 
25  .00006 
26  .oooa 
27  .0002 
28  .003 
29  .004  3.804  .105 
1930 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
.00002 
.002 
.0003 
.0002 
.0002 
.OOOl 
.00002 
3.047 
2.047 
1.708 
2.670 
3.541 
3.964 
5.024 
7.039 
6.480 
6.721 
.0007 
.117 
.008 
.004 
.003 
.002 
.0003 
1940  .ooooa  8.641  .0009 
41  .OOOl  15.420  .0006 
42  .0002  22.943  .0009 
43  .0002  39.258  .0005 
44  .0003  41 .ooa  .0007 
45  .0002  42.495  .0005 
46  .00007  39.105  .0002 
47  .075  43.220  .174 
48  .167  43.218  .386 
49  .193  38.706  .499 
1950  .197  50.035  .394 
51  .255  64.277  .397 
52  .292  67.317  .434 
53  .343  70.032  .490 
54  .276  63.738  .433 
55  .252  72.559  .347 
56  .402  77.985  s15 
57  .543  81.906  .663 
58  .524  78.662  ,666 
59  .911  89.826  1.014 
1960  .a97  96.141  .933 
61  ,687  98.058  .70 1 
62  .799  106.187  .752 
63  .aao  114.415  .769 
64  1.582  114.913  1.377 
65  1.297  124.337  1.043 
66  1.649  141 .a43  1.163 
67  1.907  150.496  1.267 
68  2.464  174.442  1.413 
69  3.019  196.858  1.534 
1970  3.494  191.871  i .a21 
71  3.357  198.554  1.691 
72  3.231  227.505  1.420 
73  4.341  258.640  1.678 
74  5.550  287.821  1.928 
75  5.382  287.335  1.873 
76  5.870  33 1.750  1.769 
77  5.937  375.210  1.582 
78  7.006  431.569  1.623 
79  9.279  493.636  1.880 
1980  11.706  540.722  2.165 
81  14.024  628.219  2.232 
if  the  alternative  of  a  restoration  of  the  fran- 
&se  tax  would  mean  extended  delay  and  prevent 
effective  negotiation  with  the  Treasury  with  re- 
spect  to  the  elimination  of  the  posted  rate  on 
Treasury  bills  and  eventually  some  change  in 
short-term  interest  rates,  he  would  have  to  go 
along  with  the  proposal  for  the  establishment  of 
the  interest  charge.  He  felt  that  action  with 
respect  to  the  restoration  of  some  measure  of 
control  over  bank  credit  at  this  time  was  more 
important  than  the  means  to  be  used  in  siphoning 
some of  the  earnings  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks 
into  the  Treasury  .  .  .  .46 
The  plan  proposed  by  Chairman  Eccles  was  accept- 
able  to  the  Treasury,  and  on  April  24,  1947  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board,  acknowledging  that  by  the 
end  of  1946  the  combined  surplus  of  the  Reserve 
Banks  exceeded  subscribed  capital,  announced  its 
decision  to  levy  an  interest  charge  on  Federal  Re- 
serve  notes  issued  by  Reserve  Banks  to  pay  into  the 
Treasury  approximately  90  percent  of  Reserve  Bank 
net  earnings.  47  The  FOMC  announced  termination 
of  the  fixed  rate  on  Treasury  bills  two  months  later.48 
The  Federal  Reserve  Board’s  voluntary  continu- 
ance  of  Fed-Treasury  transfers  under  the  “interest 
on  Federal  Reserve  notes”  designation  in  effect  oper- 
ated  like  the  legislated  franchise  tax  rule  prior  to 
1933.  Like  the  franchise  tax  rule,  the  rule  for  Fed- 
Treasury  transfers  under  the  “interest  on  Federal 
Reserve  notes”  designation  placed  no  ceiling  on  ac- 
cumulated  surplus.  Within  a few  years  this  became  a 
problem  for  the  Fed.  Questions  about  the  appropri- 
ate  level  of  surplus  were  raised  in  hearings  on  the 
Financial  Institutions  Act  of  1957;  and  the  Board 
was  aware  of  a  staff  recommendation  at  the  Bureau 
of  the  Budget  that  would  transfer  to  the  Treasury 
4s Ibid.,  p.  75. 
47 Board  of  Governors  [6]  1947, pp.  83-84. 
48 Ibid.,  pp. 91-94.  See Stein  [46]:  Chapter  10, for  a good 
discussion  of  Fed-Treasury  relations  during  this  period. 
Note:  Figures  rounded  to  millions  where  possible,  otherwise 
taken  to  first  significant  digit. 
*  From  1914  to  1932  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  were  subject  to  a 
“franchise  tax”  on  net  earnings  under  Section  7  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  Act.  Payments  to  the  Treasury  were  made  under  this 
designation  each  year  with  the  exception  of  1914-1916  and  1931, 
when  Reserve  Bank  earnings  were  not  sufficient  to  meet  dividend 
payments  as  well  as  expenses.  Tax  payments  were  temporarily 
suspended  in  1918  pending  legislation  passed  in  1919  concerning 
the  disposition  of  Reserve  Bank  net  earnings.  As  o  result  of  the 
suspension  of  the  franchise  tax  in  the  Banking  Act  of  1933,  no 
payments  were  made  in  1933  and  1934.  From  1935  to  1947  pay- 
ments  were  mode  under  Section  13b  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act. 
In  1947  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  initiated  payments  to  the 
Treasury  in  the  form  of  “interest  on  Federal  Reserve  notes.” 
Payments  hove  continued  to  the  present  under  this  designation. 
**  Not  available  by  calendar  yeor  prior  to  1929. 
Sources:  Board  of  Governors  [6]  1981,  Table  7,  and  [6]  1931, 
pp.  15-16;  U.  S.  Deportment  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic 
Analysis  [62],  Table  3.2,  and  [63],  Table  3.2;  and  U.  S. 
Congress,  Senate  [SS].  pp.  17-19. -  12  - 
all  Reserve  Bank  surplus  funds.4g  Finally,  the 
Federal  budget  deficit  for  fiscal  year  1959  was  about 
13  billion  dollars,  roughly  three  times  larger  than 
any  previous  peacetime  deficit.  As  a  result,  pressure 
on  the  Fed  to  take  further  action  on  surplus  and  Fed- 
Treasury  transfers  mounted  in  the  second  half  of 
1959. 
The  1959  Congressional  session  ended  without 
acting  on  the  matter  and  Federal  Reserve  Board 
Chairman  Martin  expressed  the  hope  that  the  Fed 
would  have  a proposed  solution  to  the  problem  before 
the  next  session.50  As  mentioned  above,  it  was  diffi- 
cult  to  justify  any  particular  level  of  Reserve  Bank 
surplus  as  appropriate.  Consequently,  the  Fed’s  pro- 
posal  appealed  to  the  principle  that  Congress  itself 
had  established  in  the  1919  amendment  to  the  Federal 
Reserve  Act.  On  this  basis,  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board  announced  in  December  1959  its  decision  to 
maintain  surplus  at  100  percent  of  subscribed  capital, 
to  immediately  transfer  to  the  Treasury  all  surplus 
currently  in  excess  of  that  amount,  and  to  transfer 
to  the  Treasury  100  percent  of  net  earnings  after 
maintaining  surplus  at  the  level  of  subscribed  capital 
thereafter.51 
The  1959  Fed  action  on  surplus  did  not  satisfy 
Congress  and  the  Treasury  for  long.  Except  for  a 
slight  budget  surplus  in  1960,  the  next  five  years 
saw  a  string  of  large  peacetime  Federal  budget 
deficits  cumulating  to  over  20  billion  dollars  by  the 
end  of  fiscal  year  1964.  In  1964,  legislation  con- 
sidered  by  Congress  threatened  to  limit  the  Fed’s 
independence  in  order  to  use  the  Fed’s  money- 
creating  power  to  help  finance  the  large  deficits.5Z 
Meanwhile,  because  of  growth  in  member  bank  assets 
and  liabilities,  corresponding  growth  in  member  bank 
capital  structure,  and  the  requirement  that  member 
banks  subscribe  to  Reserve  Bank  capital  stock  an 
amount  equal  to  6  percent  of  their  own  capital,  the 
subscribed  capital  of  the  Reserve  Banks  rose  by  over 
35  percent  from  the  end  of  1959  to  the  end  of  1964.53 
As  a  result,  pressure  to  reduce  the  Fed’s  surplus 
grew  both  because  a  reduction  in  surplus  would 
provide  a  sizable  immediate  lump-sum  payment  to 
the  Treasury  and  because  maintaining  surplus  as  a 
smaller  percentage  of  subscribed  capital  would  mean 
less  of  a  drain  on  future  Fed-Treasury  transfers. 
49 Board  of  Governors  [13]  1959, g/23/59,  p.  3368. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Board  of  Governors  [6]  1959, pp.  83-85, 96-99. 
52 Statements  on  the  proposed  legislation  by  Federal 
Reserve  Board  members  before  Congress  may  be  found 
in  Board  of  Governors  [ll]  February  1964, pp.  148-54 
and  March  1964, pp.  308-20. 
53 Board  of  Governors  [6]  1964, p.  212. 
The  logic  of  maintaining  surplus  at  the  level  of 
subscribed  capital  was  not  easy  to  defend  to  a  Con- 
gress  that  had  changed  its  mind  since  1919.  The 
problem  for  the  Fed  was  whether  to  reduce  surplus 
voluntarily  or  to  await  legislation  which  might  com- 
pletely  eliminate  surplus.  In  December  1964,  the 
Fed  announced  a  voluntary  50  percent  reduction  in 
surplus  to  the  level  of  paid-in  capital.““  This  decision 
added  524  million  dollars  to  the  amount  transferred 
to  the  Treasury  in  1965. 55  Apparently,  Congress  and 
the  Treasury  were  satisfied  since  to  this  day  Fed- 
Treasury  transfers  have  consisted  of  100  percent  of 
net  earnings  after  maintaining  surplus  at  the  level  of 
paid-in  capital. 
Recent  Reserve  Requirement  Reform 
The  first  major  legislative  reserve  requirement 
reform  in  the  post-Accord  era  was  passed  in  July 
1959.  The  most  important  provision  of  that  legis- 
lation  authorized  the  Board  of  Governors  to  permit 
vault  cash  to  count  as  required  reserves.66  The 
legislation  was  not  designed  to  make  any  changes  in 
the  existing  system  of  reserve  requirements  that 
would  have  an  important  bearing  on  monetary  policy. 
Rather,  the  reform  was  designed  to  remedy  “in- 
equities  in  the  present  system  of  reserve  requirements 
[that  arose]  primarily  from  the  differences  among 
banks  .  .  . as  to  their  holdings  of  vault  cash.“57  The 
1917  amendment  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  that 
prevented  vault  cash  from  counting  as  required  re- 
serves  was  said  to  have  resulted  in  an  inequitable 
situation  between  banks  because  many  banks,  gener- 
ally  smaller  country  banks,  find  it  least  costly  for 
operating  purposes  to  hold  relatively  larger  amounts 
of  vault  cash  than  do  other  banks.  But  the  difference 
between  country  banks  and  others  in  their  vault  cash 
holdings  had  been  more  than  compensated  for  by 
lower  reserve  requirements  for  country  banks,  so  that 
at  the  end  of  1959  the  ratio  of  vault  cash  plus  re- 
quired  reserves  to  net  demand  deposits  for  country 
banks  was  about  14  percent  compared  to  about  18 
percent  for  other  banks.58 
Obviously,  concern  for  equity  alone  was  not  suffi- 
cient  to  account  for  the  structure  of  the  1959  reserve 
requirement  reform.  This  legislation  was  essentially 
64 Ibid.,  pp.  48-50. 
55 Board  of  Governors  [ll]  January  1965, p.  113. 
56 The  legislation  is  described  in  Board  of  Governors  [ll] 
August  1959, pp.  888-89;  associated  changes  in  Regula- 
tion  D  are  described  in  Board  of  Governors  [ll]  Decem- 
ber  1959, pp.  1482-83. 
57 Board  of  Governors  [ll]  April  1959, p.  370. 
5s Ibid.,  pp.  370-71. -  13  - 
a  means  of  reducing  the  volume  of  reserves  that 
member  banks  had  to  hold.  As  mentioned  earlier, 
this  period  marked  the  beginning  of  an  exodus  of 
banks  from  the  Federal  Reserve  System  that  ulti- 
mately  led  to  the  passage  of  the  Monetary  Control 
Act  of  1980.  The  Fed  was  aware  then  that  many 
member  banks  would  withdraw  from  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  as  gradually  increasing  interest  rates 
raised  the  cost  of  holding  noninterest-earning  re- 
quired  reserves.  The  1959  vault  cash  reserve  require- 
ment  reform  should  be  seen  as  an  early  post-Accord 
response  of  the  Fed  and  the  Congress  to  the  problem 
of  Fed  membership  attrition. 
Reducing  member  bank  reserve  maintenance  cost 
for  a  given  volume  of  deposits,  either  by  allowing 
vault  cash  to  count  as  required  reserves  or  by  lower- 
ing  required  reserve  ratios  directly,  necessarily  re- 
duces  the  demand  for  Fed  liabilities,  and  thereby 
reduces  Fed  assets,  net  earnings,  and  Fed-Treasury 
transfers.5”  Required  reserves  accounted  for  only 
about  one-third  of  total  Fed  assets  and  liabilities  at 
the  end  of  1960,  and  by  the  late  1970s  this  proportion 
had  dropped  to  around  one-quarter.60  The  bulk  of 
the  remainder  is  accounted  for  by  Federal  Reserve 
notes  held  as  currency.  Nevertheless,  Fed-Treasury 
transfers  attributable  to  reserve  requirements  have 
made  significant  contributions  to  Treasury  revenue. 
Consequently  Congress  and  the  Treasury  have  been 
highly  concerned  about  the  potential  loss  of  revenue 
that  follows  reserve  requirement  reduction.  Congress 
was,  in  fact,  concerned  about  the  loss  of  Treasury 
revenue  that  resulted  from  the  1959  reform  allowing 
vault  cash  to  count  as  required  reserves.s1  Further- 
more,  concern  for  Treasury  revenue  continued  to 
play  a  major  role  in  the  search  for  a  solution  to  the 
Fed  membership  problem. 
In  1963  for  example,  the  President’s  Committee 
on  Financial  Institutions  concluded  in  discussing  a 
proposal  to  reduce  reserve  requirements  that  : 
5s Cagan  [17],  pp.  188-203 presents  evidence  relating  re- 
quired  reserve  changes  to  total  reserve  changes. 
60 See  Board  of  Governors  [9],  pp.  470,  533;  and  [7], 
pp.  28-29,  56. 
Since  1959 when  vault  cash was  made  eligible  to  satisfy 
reserve  requirements,  the  ratio  of  member-bank  require2 
reserves  to  total  Fed  assets  probably  overstates  the share 
of  Fed  assets  attributable  to  reserve  requirements,  be- 
cause if reserve requirements  were  eliminated  the demand 
for  excess  reserves  as  vault  cash  would  probably  rise. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  ratio  of  member  bank  reserve 
balances  at  the  Fed  to  total  Fed  assets  probably  under- 
states  the  share  of  Fed  assets  attributable  to  reserve 
requirements,  because  vault  cash  is  probably  larger  than 
it  would  be  without  reserve  requirements.  Proportions 
given  in  the  text  lie  roughly  within  this  range. 
61 See  U.  S.  Congress,  House  [49],  pp.  7-36  and  U.  S. 
Congress,  Senate  [56],  pp.  16-23, especially  pp.  22-23. 
Although  reserve  requirements  serve  mainly  as  a 
vehicle  for  monetary  policy,  there  is,  within  broad 
limits,  little  basis  for  judging  that  in  the  long  run 
one  level  is  preferable  to  another  in  terms  of 
facilitating  monetary  policy.  Inevitably  therefore 
the other  effects  of  reserve  requirements-on  bank 
earnings,  on  competitive  relationships  with  other 
institutions,  and  on  net  interest  payments  by  the 
Government-become  relevant  in  evaluating  the 
advisability  of  a  change  in  the  average  level  of 
requirements.  It  is  clear  that  a  substantial  reduc- 
tion  in  requirements-to  10 percent  or  less-would, 
at least  in the short  run,  result  in a sizable  increase 
in  net  profits  of  banks  (especially  of  larger  banks 
in  reserve  cities  now  subject  to  a  requirement  of 
16%  percent)  and  a  corresponding  reduction  in  net 
receipts  by  the  U.  S.  Government,  taking  into 
account  payments  by  the  Federal  Reserve  to  the 
Treasury.62 
The  Committee  recommended  against  reducing  re- 
serve  requirements,  apparently  because  of  the  associ- 
ated  loss  of  Treasury  revenue. 
In  the  196Os,  Fed  officials  argued  repeatedly  but 
without  success  for  universal  reserve  requirements 
on  grounds  that  they  would  both  ease  the  Fed’s  con- 
cern  over  membership  attrition  and  would  improve 
monetary  control.  63  Congressional  resistance  to  uni- 
versal  reserve  requirements  came  from  supporters  of 
the  dual  banking  system  tradition  who  opposed  a 
system  of  universal  reserve  requirements  on  grounds 
that  it  would  transfer  considerable  power  to  the  Fed 
and  undo  alleged  “checks  and  balances”  in  the  dual 
banking  system.  In  1967  the  American  Bankers 
Association  argued  that  universal  reserve  require- 
ments  were  not  essential  for  monetary  control  and 
advocated  lower  reserve  requirements  to  encourage 
voluntary  membership  in  the  Federal  Reserve  Sys- 
tem.64  But  most  importantly,  nonmember  banks 
simply  did  not  want  to  be  forced  to  hold  noninterest- 
earning  reserves  according  to  Fed  requirements. 
In  September  1968,  the  Fed  took  action  to  reform 
reserve  requirements  that  did  not  require  Congres- 
sional  legislation  :  it  moved  from  contemporaneous 
to  lagged  reserve  requirements.  For  most  of  the 
period  that  lagged  reserve  requirements  have  been 
in  effect,  the  Fed  has  used  the  Federal  funds  rate 
as  its  policy  instrument.  With  a  funds  rate  instru- 
ment,  reserve  requirements  made  no  positive  con- 
tribution  to  monetary  control.  The  major  benefit 
to  lagged  reserve  requirements  has  been  that  member 
69 Report  of  the  Committee  on  Financial  Institutions  . . . 
[41],  p.  12. 
63  The  Federal  Reserve  Board  recommended  universal 
reserve  requirements  in  its  Annual  Reports  from  1964 
through  1968. 
64 Banking  [S],  p.  48. -  14  - 
banks  prefer  it  to  contemporaneous  reserve  require- 
ments  because  they  feel  that  it  allows  them  to 
reduce  the  cost  of  reserve  maintenance.05  In  this 
sense  the  move  to  lagged  reserve  requirements  should 
be  viewed  as  another  Fed  response  to  the  problem 
of  membership  attrition.  It  lowered  member  banks’ 
cost  of  maintaining  reserves  according  to  Fed  re- 
quirements  without  reducing  the  size  of  the  Fed 
portfolio  or  Fed-Treasury  transfers. 
In  June  1972,  the  Fed  took  further  action  to 
reform  reserve  requirements  that  did  not  require 
Congressional  legislation.  The  reserve  city-country 
bank  classification  for  reserve  requirement  purposes, 
dating  back  to  the  National  Bank  Act,  was  dropped. 
Under  the  new  system  the  marginal  reserve  require- 
ment  on  demand  deposits  rose  with  the  volume  of 
such  deposits  at  a  given  bank.  The  move  to  gradu- 
ating  reserve  requirements  by  bank  size  instead  of  by 
geographic  location  was  said  to  be  more  equitable, 
since  banks  of  similar  size  had  sometimes  been  classi- 
fied  in  different  geographical  categories  for  reserve 
requirement  purposes.  But  the  1972  reform,  like  the 
1968  move  to  lagged  reserve  requirements,  should 
primarily  be  viewed  as  another  Fed  response  to  the 
problem  of  membership  attrition.  The  new  gradu- 
ated  system  of  reserve  requirements  was  apparently 
constructed  under  the  following  constraints.  First,  it 
was  designed  to  minimize  aggregate  release  of  re- 
serves,  so  as  to  minimize  the  reduction  in  Fed- 
Treasury  transfers.  Second,  it  was  not  to  raise 
reserve  requirements  for  banks  in  any  size  class. 
Third,  to  appear  equitable  it  was  to  have  the  marginal 
reserve  requirement  rise  with  deposit  volume  at  a 
given  bank.  Finally,  it  was  to  reduce  reserve  require- 
ments  on  small  banks,  who  generally  benefitted  least 
from  membership  in  the  Federal  Reserve  System, 
sufficiently  to  induce  them  to  remain  in  the  System.66 
In  the  late  1970s  Congressional  attention  finally 
es See  “Report  of  the Ad  Hoc  Subcommittee  on  Reserve 
Proposals”  [40].  Lagged  reserve  requirements  were, 
among  other  things,  expected  to  reduce  defensive  open 
market  ooerations.  Coats  r181  argues  theoretically  that 
this  should  not  have  been  expected  to  happen  and  pre- 
sents  evidence  that  defensive  open  market  operations 
increased  with  the  move  to  lagged  reserve  requirements. 
66 These  constraints  are  evident  in  the  discussion  in 
White  [66].  The  consequences  for  member  banks  of 
the  1972  reserve  requirement  reform  were  worked  out 
bv  taking  into  account  the  reduction  in  Federal  Reserve 
fioat  thai  occurred  at  the  same  time  due  to  a  change  in 
Fed  regulations  regarding  check  collection.  See  Board 
of  Governors  [11]  July  1972, pp.  626-30.  With  this  re- 
form,  the  structure  of- reserve- requirements  reached  its 
most  complicated  level.  See  the  table  summarizing 
changes  in  reserve  requirements  from  1917  to  1981  in 
Board  of  Governors  [6]  1981, pp.  235-37. 
focused  productively  on  the  growing  Fed  membership 
problem.67  During  this  period  the  Fed  offered  an 
alternative  to  universal  reserve  requirements  as  a 
solution  to  the  membership  problem  :  paying  interest 
on  required  reserves.  In  1977,  Federal  Reserve 
Board  Chairman  Burns  testified  before  the  Senate 
Banking  Committee  : 
In  view  of  the  apparent  reluctance  of  the  Congress 
to  enact  uniform  reserve  requirements  for  all 
banks,  the Board  has  considered  other  proposals  for 
ending  the erosion  of  Federal  Reserve  membership. 
Our  conclusion  is  that  the  payment  of  interest  on 
required  reserve  balances  is  the  most  straight- 
forward  and  appropriate  step.68 
He  noted,  however,  that: 
Since  the  Federal  Reserve  returns  virtually  all  its 
net  earnings  to  the  Treasury,  payment  of  interest 
on  required  reserve  balances  would  reduce  Trea- 
sury  revenues-something,  let  me  note  with  some 
emphasis,  that  would  not  occur  if  the  Congress 
were  to  enact  uniform  reserve  requirements  [for 
all  banks].69 
In  1978,  the  Fed  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  it 
did  not  need  Congressional  approval  to  pay  interest 
on  reserves  and  proposed  to  implement  its  own  plan, 
Congressional  reaction,  as  expressed  in  a  joint  letter 
to  Federal  Reserve  Board  Chairman  Miller  from 
Representative  Reuss  and  Senator  Proxmire  (Chair- 
men  of  the  House  and  Senate  Banking  Committees 
respectively)  was  strong  : 
We  believe  unilateral  action  by  the  Board  to  pay 
interest  on  reserve  balances  would  constitute  a 
blatant  usurpation  of  Congressional  powers  and 
would  raise  profound  questions  about  the  continued 
independence  of  the  Fed.  We  can  think  of  no 
other  action  by  the  Board  that  could  do  as  much  to 
undermine  confidence  and  trust  in  the  Board  on 
the  part  of  those  key  members  of  Congress  who 
feel  strongly  on  this  issue. 
In  the  absence  of  legislative  limitations,  the  pay- 
ment  of  interest  on  reserve  balances,  however 
modestly  begun,  could  ultimately  add  billions  of 
dollars  to  the  federal  deficit  and  could  be  viewed 
as  a  precedent  for  carte  blanche  authority  for  the 
expenditure  of  Federal  Reserve  bank  earnings 
without  restraint  by  either  the  Executive  or  Legis- 
lative  branch  of  the  government.  With  Reserve 
67 The  Federal  Reserve  Board  published  legislative 
recommendations  for  dealing  with  the membership  prob- 
lem  in  each  of  its  1970s  Annual  Reports.  Figures  de- 
scribing  the  extent  of  membership  attrition  are  reported 
in  Board  of  Governors  [6]  1978, p.  316 and  1979, p.  253. 
Board  of  Governors  [6]  1978, p.  317,  reported  an  esti- 
mate, using  1977 data, of  the aggregate  burden to member 
banks  of  Federal  Reserve  membership  in  excess  of  650 
million  dollars,  or about  9 percent  of member  bank profits 
before  taxes. 
68 Arthur  F.  Burns,  in U.  S.  Congress,  Senate  [61],  p. 30. 
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bank  earnings  now  running  in  the  neighborhood  of 
$7  billion  annually,  the  payment  of  any  part  of 
these  earnings  to  commercial  banks  can  be  viewed 
as  the  opening  wedge  in  a  serious  breach  of  the 
Constitutional  power  of  the  Congress  and  the 
President  to  control  federal  spending  and  deter- 
mine  the fiscal  policy  of  the nation.70 
The  impact  on  Fed-Treasury  transfers  of  various 
proposed  solutions  to  the  Fed  membership  problem 
was  a  major  concern  throughout  Congressional  hear- 
ings  in  1977,  1978,  and  1979.  Proposed  legislation 
before  the  Senate  Banking  Subcommittee  on  Finan- 
cial  Institutions  in  1977  authorizing  the  Fed  to  pay 
interest  on  required  reserves  limited  the  total  interest 
payment  to  10 percent  of  Fed  net  earnings.‘l  At  that 
time,  Chairman  Burns  requested  that  the  limit  be 
raised  to  15  percent  but  assured  the  Subcommittee 
that  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  intended  “to  keep 
the  net  cost  to  the  Treasury  as  low  as  possible.“72 
The  1978  Federal  Reserve  Board  proposal  to  pay 
interest  on  required  reserves  offered  a  relatively  low 
7 percent  net  earnings  limit  on  total  interest  paid  but 
also  proposed  lower  reserve  requirements.  The  plan 
included  provisions  to  price  Fed  services,  which  had 
been  provided  without  explicit  charge,  and  to  trans- 
fer  a  portion  of  Reserve  Bank  surplus  to  the  Trea- 
sury  in  order  to  minimize  loss  of  Treasury  revenue 
during  a  transition  period.  73  With  the  program  fully 
in  place,  the  Board  argued  that  Fed-Treasury  trans- 
fers  would  be  reduced  by  300  million  dollars  per 
year,  but  pointed  out  that  continued  attrition  of 
deposits  subject  to  Fed  reserve  requirements  would 
cause  a  substantial  decline  in  Fed-Treasury  transfers 
in  the  absence  of  the  program.  Since  the  program 
was  expected  to  reduce,  if  not  eliminate,  such  deposit 
attrition,  on  net  the  Board  argued  that  the  cost  to 
the  Treasury  would  be  minimal.  The  Board  pointed 
out,  however,  that  the  impact  on  Treasury  revenue 
would  be  more  favorable  if  Congress  enacted  the 
Board’s  proposed  universal  reserve  requirement  legis- 
lation.74 
In  1979  hearings  before  the  Senate  Banking  Com- 
mittee,  Senator  Proxmire  declared  that  he  regarded 
the  protection  of  Treasury  revenues  as  an  “obliga- 
tion”  of  the  Committee,  and  warned  that  transfers 
7OU. S.  Congress,  House  [.SZ], p.  781. 
71 U.  S.  Congress,  Senate  [61],  pp.  806-7. 
72 Ibid.,  p.  36. 
73  U.  S.  Congress,  House  [SZ],  pp.  122-31. 
‘4 Ibid.,  pp.  130-31. 
away  from  the  Treasury  “would  result  in  an  in- 
creased  Federal  deficit  which  in  today’s  inflationary 
environment  must  be  held  as  low  as  possible.“75  The 
Administration  itself  placed  an  implicit  limit  on  the 
cost  of  an  acceptable  reform  package,  as  indicated  in 
1979  testimony  by  Deputy  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
Robert  Carswell  : 
In  testimony  before  [the  Senate  Banking  Com- 
mittee]  last  June  and  August  and  in  a  letter  to 
the  House  Banking  Committee  in  September  1977, 
the  administration  stated  that  it  would  accept  a 
revenue  loss  of  $200-300  million,  after  tax  recover- 
ies,  to  deal  with  this  problem.  .  .  .  In  the  current 
budget  environment,  a  solution  to  the  membership 
problem  involving  a  revenue  loss  under  $200  mil- 
lion,  net  of  tax  recoveries,  is  essential.76 
The  legislation  which  emerged  as  the  Monetary 
Control  Act  of  1980  (MCA)  was  a  compromise 
among  interests  represented  by  the  various  groups, 
The  Fed’s  concern  was  to  reduce  membership  attri- 
tion.  Membership  was  to  remain  voluntary  according 
to  the  dual  banking  system  tradition,  but  a  solution 
incorporating  either  universal  reserve  requirements 
or  interest  on  required  reserves  would  have  greatly 
reduced  the  incentive  to  withdraw  from  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  and  would  have  largely  solved  the 
Fed  membership  problem.  The  Treasury  was  con- 
cerned  primarily  for  the  protection  of  its  revenue  and 
accordingly  tended  to  prefer  universal  reserve  re- 
quirements  to  interest  on  required  reserves.77  Mem- 
ber  banks  may  have  preferred  interest  on  reserves, 
but  universal  reserve  requirements  would  at  least 
relieve  them  of  a  competitive  disadvantage  relative  to 
nonmembers.  In  addition,  member  banks  could 
benefit  from  universal  reserve  requirements  because 
reserve  requirement  ratios  necessary  to  generate  an 
acceptable  volume  of  Fed-Treasury  transfers  could 
be  lower  with  the  extension  of  reserve  requirements 
to  nonmembers.  Lastly,  nonmember  depository  insti- 
tutions  obviously  preferred  that  the  Fed  pay  interest 
on  member  bank  required  reserves,  since  universal 
requirements  would  force  them  to  hold  noninterest- 
75U.  S.  Congress,  Senate  [60],  p.  2. 
‘sIbid.,  p.  525. 
77In  1977,  the  Treasury  apparently  backed  payment  of 
interest  on  required  reserves  as  part  of  a  solution  to  the 
Fed  membership  problem.  But  by  1979  the  Treasury 
was  opposed  to interest  on  required-reserves.  The  evolu- 
tion  of  the  Treasury’s  position  is  evident  in  statements 
by  W.  Michael  Blumenthal,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
in  U.  S.  Congress,  Senate  [61],  pp.  8-9;  and  Robert 
Carswell,  Deputy  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  in  U.  S. 
Congress,  Senate  [59],  pp.  193-94 and  in  U.  S.  Congress, 
Senate  [60],  pp.  523, 529. -  16  - 
earning  reserves  at  the  Fed.  The  solution  to  the  Fed 
membership  problem  adopted  by  Congress  in  the 
MCA  reduced  reserve  requirements  and  made  them 
universal,  thereby  essentially  satisfying  the  Fed,  the 
Treasury,  and  member  banks.‘* 
The  losers  are  the  nonmember  depository  institu- 
tions  who  were  required  to  meet  Fed  reserve  require- 
ments,  and  the  state  banking  supervisors  who  lost  an 
important  distinction  in  the  dual  banking  system 
which  they  had  tried  hard  to  preserve.7Q  Universal 
reserve  requirements  represent  a  major  departure 
from  the  dual  banking  system  tradition.  While  Fed 
membership  remains  voluntary,  a  constraint  on  Fed 
power  implicit  in  voluntary  membership  has  been 
substantially  weakened  since  all  depository  institu- 
tions  must  hold  reserves  according  to  Fed  require- 
ments  regardless  of  membership. 
The  reserve  requirement  reduction  is  important  in 
making  the  new  mandatory  requirements  less  burden- 
some  for  members  and  nonmembers.  It  also  reduces 
the  competitive  disadvantage  of  reservable  deposits 
relative  to  competing  nonreservable  instruments  out- 
side  the  Fed’s  jurisdiction,  such  as  money  market 
mutual  fund  shares  and  Eurodollar  deposits.  Obvi- 
ously,  the  reserve  requirement  reduction  eliminates 
some  Fed  earnings  which  would  otherwise  have  gone 
to  the  Treasury,  though  Treasury  losses  could  be 
somewhat  offset  by  higher  tax  revenues  from  in- 
creased  bank  profits. 
The  MCA  also  directs  the  Fed  to  price  its  ser- 
vices.80  This  reform  gives  banks  a  chance  to  effec- 
tively  compete  against  the  Fed  for  correspondent 
banking  business,  while  simultaneously  eliminating  a 
drain  on  Fed  earnings  and  Fed-Treasury  transfers 
that  had  previously  resulted  from  Fed  services  being 
provided  to  member  banks  without  explicit  charge. 
The  legislative  history  of  the  Monetary  Control 
7s Interestingly,  George  Benston,  writing  in  1978 about 
likely  solutions  to  the  Fed  membership  problem,  pre- 
dicted  that universal  reserve  requirements  would  “not  be 
instituted  so  long  as  only  nonmember  institutions  would 
lose  and nobody  else would  clearly  or  significantly  gain.” 
Benston  [5],  p.  62. 
79 See  William  C.  Harris,  Conference  of  State  Bank 
Supervisors,  in  U.  S.  Congress,  Senate  [SS],  pp.  41-46. 
The  American  Bankers  Association  (ABA)  had  also  op- 
posed  universal  reserve  requirements  through  1979.  See 
John  H.  Perkins,  President  of  the  American  Bankers 
Association,  in  U.  S.  Congress,  House  [51],  pp.  535-36. 
But  interestingly,  in  1980 the  ABA  came  out  in  support 
of  universal  reserve  requirements.  See  C.  C.  Hope,  Jr., 
President  of  the American  Bankers  Association,  in  U.  S. 
Congress,  Senate  [SS],  pp.  125-27. 
so See  Board  of  Governors  [lo],  pp.  447-48. 
Act  indicates  that  concern  for  Treasury  revenue  sig- 
nificantly  affected  the  course  of  the  debate  on  reserve 
requirement  reform  in  the  MCA.  Despite  the  fact 
that  reserve  requirements  have  only  been  responsible 
for  a  relatively  small  fraction  of  total  Fed-Treasury 
transfers,  the  sums  involved  have  been  large  enough 
to  warrant  considerable  effort  by  the  Treasury  to 
influence  the  outcome  of  the  reforms.  As  mentioned 
above,  either  some  form  of  payment  of  interest  on 
reserves  or  universal  reserve  requirements  would 
have  largely  solved  the  Fed  membership  problem; 
the  former  would  have  satisfied  both  member  and 
nonmember  depository  institutions  as  well  as  the 
Fed.  But  the  Treasury  preferred  universal  reserve 
requirements  because  payment  of  interest  on  reserves 
would  have  greatly  reduced  Fed-Treasury  transfers, 
Concern  for  maintaining  Treasury  revenue  accounts 
for  the  fact  that  universal  reserve  requirements  rather 
than  the  payment  of  interest  on  reserves  was  ulti- 
mately  adopted  by  Congress  as  the  solution  to  the 
Fed  membership  problem  in  the  MCA.81 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Reserve  requirements  at  the  national  level  have 
been  supported  by  a  succession  of  three  prominent 
rationales,  namely,  that  reserve  requirements  have 
been  necessary  for  liquidity  provision,  Federal  Re- 
serve  credit  policy,  and  monetary  control.  However, 
reserve  requirements  have  never  served  these  func- 
tions  well,  and  often  have  not  served  them  at  all. 
Although  fractional  reserve  requirements  contributed 
somewhat  to  individual  bank  liquidity,  banking  crises 
in  the  National  Banking  era  and  in  the  early  1930s 
demonstrated  that  reserve  requirements  could  not 
guarantee  liquidity  for  the  banking  system  as  a 
whole. 
The  role  played  by  reserve  requirements  in  Fed 
credit  policy  in  the  interwar  period  varied  greatly. 
From  the  early  years  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System 
through  the  1920s  the  Fed  relied  on  the  discount  rate 
as  its  primary  policy  instrument.  Credit  conditions 
were  managed  by  manipulating  the  discount  rate  ; but 
credit,  money,  and  reserve  demand  were  essentially 
81 The  extent  to  which  concern  for  maintenance  of 
Treasury  revenue  came  to  dominate  the  solution  to  the 
Fed  membership  problem  adopted  in  the  MCA  is  evi- 
dent  in  U.  S.  Congress,  House  [SO],  especially  the  dis- 
senting  views,  and  in  testimony  by  Paul  A.  Volcker, 
Chairman  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  in  U.  S.  Con- 
gress,  Senate  [SS],  pp.  4-39,  especially  pp.  10-11. -  17  - 
accommodated  at  a  given  discount  rate  so  that  re- 
serve  requirements  did  not  effectively  restrain  credit 
expansion  during  those  years.  In  particular,  reserve 
requirements  did  not  function  well  to  restrain  credit 
expansion  during  the  stock  market  boom  of  1928  and 
1929.  In  the  1930s  credit  demand  was  low,  excess 
reserves  were  large,  and  reserve  requirements  were 
not  then  important  for  restraining  credit  expansion. 
However,  reserve  requirements  were  useful  for  the 
Fed  to  immobilize  excess  reserves  which  it  then 
regarded  as  excessive. 
During  the  period  of  increasing  concern  for  mone- 
tary  control  dating  from  the  1950s  free  reserves  and 
the  Federal  funds  rate  were  both  utilized  as  operating 
variables,  with  the  Federal  funds  rate  emerging  as 
the  primary  policy  instrument  in  the  early  1970s.  In 
the  1970s  money  growth  was  managed  by  manipu- 
lating  the  funds  rate.  Previously,  money  and  credit 
conditions  were  managed  by  manipulating  the  target 
for  free  reserves  and  the  discount  rate.  With 
either  of  these  operating  procedures,  reserves  are 
merely  supplied  as  required  to  support  the  quantity 
of  money  and  credit  demanded  given  the  operating 
target.  Since  both  the  free  reserve/discount  rate 
and  Federal  funds  rate  operating  procedures  are 
essentially  accommodative,  reserve  requirements  did 
not  exercise  an  effective  constraint  on  monetary  ex- 
pansion  during  the  post-Accord  period  in  which 
these  operating  procedures  were  utilized. 
Since  October  1979,  the  Fed  has  used  nonbor- 
rowed  reserves  as  its  monetary  control  instrument. 
But  the  post-October  1979  monetary  control  pro- 
cedure,  employing  a  nonborrowed  reserve  instrument 
with  lagged  reserve  requirements,  amounts  to  target- 
ing  net  borrowed  reserves  in  any  given  reserve  state- 
ment  week.  However,  net  borrowed  or  free  reserve 
targeting  is  accommodative,  so  even  after  the  adop- 
tion  of  a nonborrowed  reserve  operating  procedure  in 
October  1979,  reserve  requirements  still  do  not  exer- 
cise  an  effective  constraint  on  monetary  expansion. 
While  net  borrowed  reserve  and  nonborrowed 
reserve  targeting  are  identical  within  a  reserve  state- 
ment  week,  they  are  different  in  their  dynamic 
response  to  money  stock  targeting  error.  A  pre- 
determined  net  borrowed  reserve  path  embodies  no 
automatic  mechanism  to  correct  money  stock  target- 
ing  error.  By  contrast,  nonborrowed  reserve  target- 
ing  can  embody  an  automatic  corrective  feedback 
mechanism.  However,  the  automatic  corrective 
response  to  money  stock  targeting  error  under  the 
post-October  1979  nonborrowed  reserve-lagged  re- 
serve  requirements  monetary  control  procedure  could 
be  duplicated  without  imposition  of  reserve  require- 
ments. 
In  contrast  to  the  relatively  minor  role  that  reserve 
requirements  have  played  in  liquidity  provision  and 
in  implementing  the  Fed’s  credit  and  monetary  con- 
trol  policies,  reserve  requirements  have  consistently 
functioned  to  provide  revenue  for  the  United  States 
Treasury.  Furthermore,  financing  considerations 
have  substantially  influenced  reserve  requirement 
legislation  throughout  the  history  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System.  Reserve  requirement  reform  in 
the  early  years  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  was 
Iargely  designed  to  enhance  the  Fed’s  power  to  create 
money  in  order  to  provide  reserves  to  the  banking 
system,  to  meet  its  own  financial  needs,  and  to  finance 
United  States  participation  in  World  War  I. 
Since  the  Accord,  rising  inflation  and  interest  rates 
have  increased  the  cost  of  holding  noninterest- 
earning  required  reserves  at  the  Fed.  Fed  non- 
interest-earning  reserve  requirements  put  member 
banks  at  a  disadvantage  relative  to  nonmembers  who 
generally  had  lower  reserve  requirements  and  were 
allowed  to  hold  interest-earning  assets  as  reserves. 
Because  membership  in  the  Federal  Reserve  System 
is  voluntary  under  the  dual  banking  system  tradition, 
increasing  numbers  of  banks  withdrew  from  the 
System  over  this  period  as  a  result  of  the  increasing 
cost  of  maintaining  required  reserves  at  the  Fed. 
Major  reserve  requirement  reform  during  this  period 
prior  to  the  Monetary  Control  Act  was  largely  de- 
signed  to  reduce  the  cost  of  meeting  Fed  reserve 
requirements  and  should  be  viewed  as  a  response  to 
the  problem  of  Fed  membership  attrition. 
Reducing  member  bank  reserve  requirements  for  a 
given  deposit  volume  necessarily  reduces  the  demand 
for  Fed  liabilities,  and  thereby  reduces  Fed  assets 
and  Fed-Treasury  transfers.  Fed  reserve  require- 
ments  have  only  accounted  for  a  small  fraction  of 
Fed  liabilities,  the  bulk  being  accounted  for  by  Fed- 
eral  Reserve  notes  held  as  currency.  Nevertheless, 
Fed-Treasury  transfers  attributable  to  reserve  re- 
quirements  have  contributed  significantly  to  Trea- 
sury  revenue  during  this  period.  Consequently,  Con- 
gress  and  the  Treasury  have  been  highly  concerned 
about  the  potential  loss  of  revenue  that  follows  from 
reducing  the  cost  to  member  banks  of  holding  re- 
quired  reserves  at  the  Fed  either  by  lowering  reserve 
requirements  or  by  paying  interest  on  required  re- 
serves.  That  concern  played  a  major  role  in  the 
solution  to  the  Fed  membership  problem  adopted  in 
the  Monetary  Control  Act  of  1980. 
Even  though  reserve  requirement  reform  embodied 
in  the  Monetary  Control  Act  appears  to  have  been 
motivated  largely  by  concern  for  the  Fed  membership 
problem  and  Treasury  revenue,  the  reserve  require- 
ment  reform  could  significantly  improve  monetary -  18  - 
control  if  followed  up  with  further  reform.  Specific- 
ally,  with  contemporaneous  reserve  requirements  and 
a  nonborrowed  or  total  reserve  instrument,  the 
money  multiplier  could  provide  a valuable  operational 
link  between  reserves  and  the  targeted  money  stock. 
Reserve  requirements  and  the  Monetary  Control  Act 
reforms  could  then  contribute  significantly  to  mone- 
tary  control  by  stabilizing  the  money  multiplier  and 
tightening  the  link  between  the  reserve  instrument 
and  the  targeted  money  stock. 
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